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Introduction 
Thirty years ago, in the same year that witnessed pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen 
Square and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first email that marked the birth of the internet was 
easily overshadowed. In 1989, approximately 500,000 users were connected through MCI Mail 
and CompuServe email servers. Later in that same year, Tim Berners-Lee and his team at CERN 
invented the World Wide Web, but it was not open to public use until 1991 (Waring, 2018). As 
of January 2019, the total number of internet users across the world reached 4.39 billion, more 
than half of the world’s total population (Kemp, 2019).1  The impact the internet and other digital 
technologies have on the lives of those who have access to them cannot be overstated; nearly 
every facet of the daily lives of individuals, corporations, and governments are affected.   
One such area of society that has been empowered by the internet is human rights. The 
internet and digital technologies allow for the recognition, advocation, and protection of human 
rights. People around the world have access to faster and exponentially more information than 
ever before. The possibilities for education, politics, healthcare, work and equality have greatly 
expanded. The internet provides new opportunities for the progression of humanity, but not 
without a cost. 
Last year in Shanghai, Dong Yaoqiong livestreamed herself throwing black paint on a 
poster of Chinese President Xi Jinping in an act of protest against him and the Chinese 
Community Party. Within hours police were at her door and she has not been heard from since 
(Ma, 2018). In 2017, the German police orchestrated a coordinated raid in all but two of its 
states. The homes of 36 individuals accused of posting alleged hateful and extremist content on 
social media were raided (Shimer, 2017). Maria Motuznaya, 23-years old, was placed on 
Russia’s official list of extremists and terrorists after memes she posted on her social media 
account when she was 20 years old resurfaced. She faced up to six years in prison as a result 
(Robinson, 2018). While reporting on and livestreaming a demonstration by immigration 
activists in Memphis, Tennessee, journalist Manuel Duran was arrested and placed in 
Immigration & Custom Enforcement (ICE) custody. After having all criminal charges dropped in 
court, Duran was immediately detained by ICE (U.S. Press Freedom Tracker, 2018). 
The transformative power of the internet to both empower and infringe on human rights 
has not been lost on states. As a relatively new domain, the policies in cyberspace remain in their 
trial periods. Each state is implementing, redacting, and implementing again policies affecting 
their citizens’ rights in order to strike a balance between national security and collective and 
individual rights. Several influential leaders in cyberspace have emerged for different reasons: 
the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union. Although the European Union can be 
considered a state actor, rather than a political system, because of the trait of shared sovereignty, 
this thesis will use Germany as a case study for reasons of consistency, equal level analysis, and 
                                                          
1 However, despite claims in 2013 by Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt that everybody in the world 
would be connected to the internet by 2020 (Gross, 2013), a substantial portion of the global population 
remains unconnected. In 2016, 90 percent of the population that does not have access to the internet are in 
developing countries, highlighting the issue of disproportionate modernization across regions. 
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due to the arguably hegemonic role of Germany in the European Union (Paterson, 2011; 
Kornelius 2010, Schönberger, 2012).2  
Each state places various degrees of emphasis on human rights affected by the internet. 
On one end of the spectrum, Germany aims to protect its citizens’ data and privacy, while on the 
opposite end China enforces stringent censorship. The United States and Russia fall somewhere 
in between. Regarding the nature of this research, and the often-secretive nature of states’ 
domestic cyber policies, an acknowledgement must first be made in the difficulty to accurately 
quantify the numbers and statistics of internet users and victims of internet crackdowns. An 
honest effort will be made to cite primary sources from each state but will often be qualified by 
state-biased think tanks and military reports. 
The goal of this thesis is to provide a comparative analysis of the state of digital rights in 
four states across the human rights spectrum: China, Russia, the United States, and Germany. In 
order to do so, a review of literature regarding internet access as a human right will be 
conducted, as well as an overview of the evolution of digital rights. Next, a brief overview of the 
major domestic cyber policies and international stance of each of the four cases will be 
presented. Once a clear understanding of the digital rights situation for each state is established, a 
comparative analysis will be undertaken. In order to aid in the process of this analysis and 
provide insight for further research, this thesis offers several hypotheses on the relationships 
between government transparency and invasiveness in individual sovereignty and political 
stability and likelihood of government interference in citizens’ digital rights. These are: 
 H1: As a state’s transparency decreases it is more likely to be invasive of its citizens’ 
digital rights. 
H2: As a state’s transparency increases it is more likely to protect its citizens’ digital 
rights. 
H3: States with low levels of political stability are more likely to interfere in their citizens’ 
digital rights through policies that are claimed necessary to protect national security. 
H4: States with high levels of political stability are more likely to implement policies to 
protect their citizens’ digital rights. 
Rather than simply providing an overarching analysis of the stance individual 
governments have on their respective citizens’ digital rights situation, these hypotheses and their 
results aim to search for a deeper correlation. As a relatively new field, the analysis of the 
treatment of digital rights and the progression of policies affecting these rights in various 
situations in the current world order are critical to understand how and when the current 
international policy gap concerning human rights affected by the internet and digital collections 
will be resolved. 
This thesis will be looking at domestic policies relating to cyberspace and the internet 
mostly between 1995 and 2019, unless policies prior to the internet are worth noting. This 
                                                          
2 This is a debatable claim (Kundnani 2012). For the purpose of this thesis, Germany will be understood as the 
representative of its own policies as well as EU policies because the issue of cybersecurity is comparable to 
economic and trade issues. Therefore, according to the EU charter jurisdiction, the issue of cybersecurity falls 
on the union level.   
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timeframe was deliberately chosen in order to provide consistency between the four case studies. 
Despite the internet being publicly accessible since 1991, its accessibility in the four case studies 
varies. For example, it was not until 1994 that China became officially recognized as a country 
accessible to the internet (CERNIC, 2001). As is often the case with policy analysis, by the time 
this thesis will be finished it would be of no surprise if new laws and policies are implemented in 
each case study; however, in order to avoid ceaseless additions this thesis will only analyze 
policies prior to March, 2019. 
The data concerning digital rights violations for this thesis will come from Freedom 
House’s annual Freedom on the Net reports for each state. In these reports an overall internet 
freedom score is given to each country out of 100, where 100 is the worst and 0 is the best. This 
score is a cumulation of three subsections: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violation of 
users’ rights. The last of these subsections, violation of users’ rights, is of particular interest and 
will be used heavily during the comparative analysis section. This score is out of 40, where 40 
represents the highest volume of users’ rights violations, and 0 represents no user rights 
violations. To supplement the sections relating to human rights, Transparency International and 
Human Rights Watch will also be cited. The World Bank’s global governance indicators will be 
used to determine a state’s transparency and political stability levels. The former will be 
measured by the control of corruption governance score and the latter by the political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism score. Both of these scores fall between -2.5 to 2.5, the lower 
end of this range being the worst while the upper range is the best. Finally, wherever possible an 
honest effort to use primary policies in their original languages will be made for the Germany 
and China sections. Where this is not possible, academic journals and news articles for these 
languages will also be sought. 
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Evolution of the Conceptions of Human and Digital Rights 
I.  SHOULD A RIGHT TO THE INTERNET EXIST? 
 
“Given that the Internet has become an indispensable tool for realizing a range 
of human rights, combating inequality, and accelerating development and human progress, 
ensuring universal access to the Internet should be a priority for all States.”  
(La Rue, 2011) 
  
In June of 2011, amidst the chaos of the Arab Spring, the United Nations special 
rapporteur, Frank La Rue, published a report declaring that the internet and human rights are 
unquestionably intertwined. Previous declarations, charters, and conventions already 
acknowledged this connection, going so far as to affirm that access to the internet is a human 
right,3 but this was the first definitive assertion by the United Nations. Numerous articles quickly 
took this report to mean that the United Nations considers access to the internet to be a human 
right (Howell and West, 2016). However, critics soon emerged and contested this interpretation 
of the report and instead used the above quote to justify, among other arguments, that the internet 
is an enabler of rights, but not a right by itself. 
Three main arguments emerged in the question of whether the internet constitutes a 
human right. One camp argues that it is undoubtedly a right and thus states should be obligated 
to provide access to it. Another argument is made that because the internet ensures the 
safeguarding of natural rights it is a legal right. Lastly, there are those who say the internet is not 
a human right and saying otherwise will lead to the devaluation of other rights. Yet, despite these 
different interpretations there tends to be a general agreement on the role of the internet on 
protecting and facilitating other human rights. 
Within the last two decades an increasing number of charters, conventions, and reports 
have argued that the use of the internet allows individuals to exercise various fundamental 
human rights protected by the UDHR, ECHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR, including: the right to 
information protected by Articles 19, 20, and 26 UDHR, the right to control access to 
information protected by Article 12 UDHR, the right to privacy protected by Article 17 ICCPR 
and Article 8(2) ECHR, freedom of expression protected by Article 19 UDHR,  and freedom to 
assemble protected by Article 20 UDHR (Mathiesen, 2014; Watt, 2017). The progression of the 
recognition of the internet in protecting these established rights can be seen in Table 2.1 and 
Table 2.2 where an increase in the rights associated with the internet has increased over the 
years. 
 
A. The Internet is a Human Right  
 
Academics and practitioners classify human rights as negative or positive rights 
(Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, 2007). Negative rights refer to rights that must be protected 
from outside intrusion and include rights such as freedom of expression and freedom from 
torture. In the context of internet access this means states would be prohibited from interfering in 
or blocking citizens’ ability to connect. Positive rights refer to human rights that a state must 
                                                          
3 Namely courts and parliaments in both France and Estonia affirmed that internet access is a human right 
(Cerf, 2012). 
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provide for its citizens and is often attributed to rights such as the right to education and the right 
to legal recourse. In the case of internet access, this would mean governments must ensure that 
all citizens have equal access which requires a government to provide adequate infrastructure 
and resources to make internet connectivity possible. As Penney (2011) noted, the “Special 
Rapporteur examined Internet access rights in both senses, not only talking about people’s 
freedom to access Internet content, but also state obligations to provide access to the physical 
infrastructure necessary for Internet connectivity” (Penney, 2011:15). Accordingly, despite not 
explicitly stating that the right to the internet is a human right, it can be assumed through this 
context and a close reading of UDHR Article 19, restated here for convenience: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom 
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (G.A. Res. 217A). 
 The controversy begins when, in his 2011 report, La Rue explained that Article 19 “was 
drafted with foresight to include and to accommodate future technological developments through 
which individuals can exercise their right to freedom of expression” (La Rue, 2011). The term 
that justifies this interpretation is “media.” Despite being drafted over half a century prior, La 
Rue underscores that the UDHR and subsequent conventions were purposefully written in such 
language so as to later incorporate more advanced means of communication. Indeed, Land 
(2013) concludes that through the drafting process of the ICCPR and UDHR, media has been 
confirmed to mean both the channel and the form of expression. 
 Semantics are important in determining the legitimacy of the right to the internet. It is 
valid to say that initial human rights conventions have not aged well in the digital age. For 
example, General Comment No. 16 issued in 1966 on privacy lacks explicit mention of pressing 
issues, including: 
banning untargeted, mass surveillance, bulk metadata collection and retention; 
intelligence services/law enforcement access to communication data held by third-party 
providers and internet companies including in a ‘cloud’; the relationship between private 
companies and governments; biometric data gathering (through, for example, finger-
printing, facial recognition software) and transborder access to non-publicly available 
data, circumventing the requirements of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. (Watt, 
2017:788) 
Yet, it would have been impossible to explicitly account for and anticipate all of these 
issues prior to their inception. As such, it is to the discretion of UN policymakers and states in 
accordance with these conventions to carefully interpret and integrate modern issues with 
fundamental rights. 
Article 19 of the UDHR is often used to spearhead the recognition of the internet as a 
human right but it is not alone. Under Article 27 of the UDHR, individuals have a right to enjoy 
their culture, religion, language and share in scientific advancements and its benefits (G.A. Res. 
217A). This latter portion furthermore takes into account the foresight the original writers of the 
UDHR possessed. Loss of access to information technologies, specifically the internet, would be 
detrimental to the world’s most marginalized people where access to the internet directly 
translated to “health, education, employment, the arts, [and] gender equality” (Edwards, 2012). 
Technological progress and the fulfillment of fundamental rights, particularly freedom of 
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association and expression, are inseparable. The timing of the UN special report, published 
during the internet-enabled Arab Springs, further undermines the connection between access to 
internet, as both a “media” described in Article 19 and a “scientific advancement” stated in 
Article 27, and human rights. 
Simply put: times change. Modernization and globalization aided to usher in the 
Information Age through the internet. Cultures, systems of governance and technologies are all 
subject to change, the latter just happened to transform incredibly fast. In order to not be left 
behind, interpretations of human rights must also change to ensure the adequate protection of 
human rights. 
B. The Internet is a Legal Right  
  
 The internet has empowered and transformed the way in which individuals communicate 
and share information. Indeed, as Powell, Byrne and Dailey (2010:163) emphasize, the internet 
“has become a ‘basic requirement’ for social inclusion and economic participation,” both of 
which are fundamental rights protected by the UDHR. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that 
the absence of access to the internet disadvantages and excludes individuals from a modern 
lifestyle and equal social opportunity, thus is arguably a human rights violation (Hammond, 
1997; O'Hara and Stevens, 2006; Tully, 2014). 
 However, despite a general acknowledgement of the importance of the internet in 
upholding human rights, even La Rue admits that “there is no right to the internet ‘as such’” 
(Land, 2013:400). Upon closer inspection, while the UN report did bring just focus on the 
importance of the internet in connection to human rights and calls for states to work towards 
universal access to the internet, it did not explicitly state the internet is a human right. Similarly, 
the UN Human Rights Council Resolution on Internet and Human Rights passed in 2012 
includes the “promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet,” but does 
not mention the internet as a human right (York, 2012). 
 After coming to this conclusion, Tomalty (2017) suggests clearly distinguishing human 
rights between “legal human rights,” such as those articulated in the UDHR, ICCPR, and 
ICESCR and natural rights, as in “the moral rights taken to be held by all humans simply by 
virtue of being human.” Tomalty (2017:6) clarifies that the latter must be grounded in morally 
relevant attributes of humanity in which the most dominate attribute is arguably that natural 
rights are “grounded in fundamental interests shared by all, or at least the majority, of humans.” 
This implies that natural rights are more basic and inherent to humanity, regardless of society or 
era, and exemplified in the right to not be tortured and freedom from slavery. By this logic, 
access to the internet, as a commercial product of humans, is not a natural right because having 
access cannot be held universally by all humans simply in virtue of being human. 
 That is not to say that a legal right for the internet does not exist. Legal rights are social 
constructs that can emerge over time, in light of technological and societal advancements. In its 
most basic form, legal rights are a social construct are decided by people, not discovered 
(Tomalty, 2017). Legal rights must be created in order to protect natural rights, therefore the 
natural rights articulated in human rights conventions are both natural and legal, but not all legal 
rights are natural. For example, UDHR Article 15 protects an individual’s right to a nationality. 
Nationality is a social construct that encompasses a more fundamental human right, namely 
freedom of movement which is arguably a natural right. Although both are now legal and human 
rights due to their presence in legal human rights documents, only UDHR Article 13 freedom of 
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movement, is a natural right. The implication of this differentiation would be domestic 
implementation. If a state acknowledges a legal right to internet access without international 
treaties recognizing it as a human right, this implies a state could be exempt from having to 
provide internet access for all people within the country. Instead, much like the legal right to 
vote, ability to exercise this right is contingent upon citizenship, age, and other factors. 
 As previously discussed above, access to and use of the internet involves several natural 
rights including freedom of expression, association, information, and education. Although it is 
possible to exercise these rights through other means, the scope of the internet and its presence in 
increasingly more aspects of society necessitates its access to ensure equal opportunities. Given 
the apparent enduring nature of the internet in society, it is important to recognize that the 
internet is a legal right and should be protected as such. 
 
C. The Internet is not a Human Right 
  
 The UN Special Report used the protests in the Middle East and North Africa as proof of 
the transformative power of the internet to be used as a conductor for human rights such as 
freedoms of expression, information, and association. Yet, mention of the internet as a human 
right was starkly absent, as it should be. Vinton Cerf (2012), a co-creator of the networking 
technology that made the internet possible, noted this absence in his op-ed piece in The New 
York Times and concluded this was due to the understanding that “the Internet was valuable as a 
means to an end, not an end in itself.” Human rights are characterized by their necessity to 
maintain human dignity. It is possible to live without the internet and equating access to it to 
rights that afford shelter, food, and water to individuals is wrong. In fact, access to the internet is 
so intrinsically bound to already existing human rights that formalizing its recognition as a 
separate right is unnecessary and could arguably dilute and threaten other rights (Tully, 2014; 
Land, 2013).  
 The internet is undoubtedly an important means to exercise existing human rights and 
therefore aids in progressing the human condition. However, access to the internet is simply an 
enabler of rights, it must not pretend it is a right by itself. The speed in which technology is 
changing makes predicting technological developments and how these developments will impact 
civil and human rights impractical at best and impossible at worst. The international community 
should be aware of this and remain cautious about “immortalizing any particular kind of 
technology in international law” (Land, 2013:400). 
 While the internet is often praised for its ability to disseminate mass amounts of 
information, this same attribute contributes to the violation of other rights. As Tully (2014:184) 
aptly suggests, “it is equally apparent that Internet access and use can threaten the enjoyment of 
human rights for certain groups and the potential to affront human dignity.” The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child has oft been concerned with increasing access to the internet 
internationally: 
 
Estonia has been requested to assess sexual exploitation and child trafficking on the 
Internet. Pornographic and other harmful material was accessible to children via the 
Internet in Monaco, Croatia, Greece, Costa Rica, Norway, Micronesia and Japan. 
Germany was commended for attempting to protect children from this information. 
Children were exposed to racist and violent images and games through the Internet in 
Luxembourg and Austria. Indeed, children were sexually abused following contact 
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established on websites in Sweden and Slovenia. Internet chat rooms frequented by 
children had been arbitrarily closed in South Korea. (Tully, 2014:183) 
 
 Additionally, the use of the internet to facilitate and expand human trafficking networks 
and the prostitution of women has violated the rights advocated for by the Committee on 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Denmark is one such case of many (United 
Nations, 1997). Recognizing access to the internet as a human right indirectly violates well-
established basic human rights of children and women. 
 Philip Alston (1984:614) cautioned that “a proliferation of new rights would be much 
more likely to contribute to a serious devaluation of the human rights currency than to enrich 
significantly the overall coverage provided by existing rights.” Declaring access to the internet to 
be a human right gives way to a valid fear of a domino effect of calls for further rights in other 
technologies, the culmination of which might “dilute the protections for freedom of expression in 
general” (Land, 2013:400). Each state has a hierarchy of human rights that they place importance 
on. These hierarchies have led to disagreements on ideological values and the refusal to accept 
legal obligation, the combination of which resulted in the division of the UDHR into the ICCPR 
and ICESCR (Tolley, 1987). The addition of more rights would add unnecessary complexity and 
lead to further disagreements between states about each right’s moral and legal worth. This 
would not only call into question the scope of states that would accept the legal obligation of 
providing and protecting internet access, it would also once more call into question the validity 
of more fundamental rights. Furthermore, the fact that countries, even democracies, claim that 
the internet takes a back seat to national security implies that access to it cannot be an inalienable 
human right (Goel, 2019). 
 
II. EVOLUTION OF DIGITAL RIGHTS 
 
 For the purpose of this thesis the term “digital rights” will refer to the practices that are 
protected and realized by the use of digital technologies, particularly the internet. Which human 
rights this definition encompasses has changed over time and is subject to further changes in the 
future as technology progresses. Anticipating the threats to fundamental human rights prior to the 
publicization of the internet, the Council of Europe passed the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1981. This was the first 
international convention to address the “increasing flow across frontiers of personal data 
undergoing automatic processing” (Council of Europe, 2001). As shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, 
the main concern of this convention was to safeguard the right to privacy, a theme that remained 
consistent throughout the years in various digital rights conventions and charters. 
 The 2001 Convention on Cybercrime is the first international treaty that aims to address 
crime in cyberspace by harmonizing the national laws of involved countries and improving 
investigative techniques (ETS No. 185, 2001). Article 15 of this convention specifically states 
that the implementation and application of powers and procedures addressed in the convention 
are pursuant to the obligations outlined in the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the ICCPR. Unlike the 1981 
convention, there is an article within the Convention of Cybercrime that protects a right outlined 
in the ICESCR, namely the rights of children. 
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Table 2.1 ICCPR Articles 1981 
Convention for 
the Protection 
of Individuals 
with regard to 
Automatic 
Processing of 
Personal Data 
2001 
Budapest 
Convention 
on 
Cybercrime 
2002 
People's 
Communication 
Charter 
2006 
APC 
Internet 
Rights 
Charter 
(revised) 
2011 
Charter of 
Human 
Rights and 
Principles 
for the 
Internet 
Right to Legal Recourse 
(Article 2) 
— Article 15 Article 7 Theme 7.2 Article 18 
Gender Equality  
(Article 3) 
— Article 15 — Theme 1.5 Article 2(c) 
Right to Equality 
Before the Law 
(Article 14) 
— Article 15 Article 15 — — 
Privacy  
(Article 17) 
Article 12(2), 
Article 11 
Article 15 Article 13 Theme 5 Article 8 
Freedom of Thought,  
Conscience and Religion  
(Article 18) 
— Article 15 — — Article 6 
Freedom of Opinion  
and Expression 
 (Article 19) 
— Article 15 Article 2 Theme 2, 3 Article 5 
Prohibition of  
Propaganda   
(Article 20) 
— Article 15 Article 14 — Article 5(e) 
Right to Peaceful  
Assembly  
(Article 21) 
— Article 15 — Theme 2.3 Article 
5(a),6 
Freedom of  
Association  
(Article 22) 
— Article 15 — — Article 6 
Rights for Children  
(Article 24) 
— Article 15 Article 11 — Article 12 
Right to Participate 
 in the Conduct of  
Public Affairs  
(Article 25) 
— Article 15 Article 10 — Article 15 
Rights for Minorities  
(Article 27) 
— Article 15 Article 8, 9 Theme 1.9 Article 2(b) 
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Table 2.2 ICESCR Articles 1981 
Convention for 
the Protection 
of Individuals 
with regard to 
Automatic 
Processing of 
Personal Data 
2001 
Budapest 
Convention 
on 
Cybercrime 
2002 
People's 
Communication 
Charter 
2006 
APC 
Internet 
Rights 
Charter 
(revised) 
2011 
Charter of 
Human 
Rights and 
Principles 
for the 
Internet 
Gender Rights    
(Article 3) 
— — — Theme 1.5 Article 
2(c) 
Right to Work     
(Article 6) 
— — — — Article 14 
Just Work Conditions  
(Article 7) 
— — — Theme 1.7 — 
Social Security    
(Article 9) 
— — — — Article 4, 
17 
Rights for Children      
(Article 10) 
— Article 9 Article 11 — Article 12 
Right to Education  
(Article 13/14) 
 
— — Article 5 — Article 10 
Take Part in Cultural  
Life and Benefit from  
Scientific Progress  
(Article 15) 
— — Article 9 Theme 4.3 Article 11 
 
The Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention, has been 
ratified by forty-nine parties, including the United States and Germany. Both of which also 
ratified the ICCPR (see Table 2.3). China, which is not a signatory of the ICCPR, is also not a 
signatory of this convention. Russia, however, has ratified the ICCPR but their primary objection 
to the Budapest Convention has less to do with the human rights pursuant to the ICCPR and 
more to do with the allowance for “unilateral trans-border access of data by law enforcement 
agencies of one country without notifying the authorities in another county, thus…violating state 
sovereignty” (Barmin et al., 2011:74). 
The remaining three categories listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are charters aimed to expand 
the scope of digital rights and bring awareness to policy-makers on the domestic and 
international levels. Each charter specifically states that access to the internet/cyberspace is a 
human right. Indeed, this movement has led Estonia, Finland, and Costa Rica to recognize 
internet access as a human right (Tully, 2014). Furthermore, a 2012 Global Internet User Survey 
found that eighty-six percent of internet users agreed or strongly agreed that the internet should 
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be considered a basic human right (Internet Society, 2012). Yet, despite progress at the 
individual and national levels, international organizations and treaties have yet to definitively 
make this leap. 
Table 2.3 Signatory Statuses  
State ICCPR ICESCR Right to the 
Internet 
China Signed Ratified Not Recognized 
Russia Ratified Ratified Not Recognized 
United Sates Ratified Signed Not Recognized 
Germany Ratified Ratified Not Recognized 
Source: (Neumayer, 2007) 
 
As demonstrated in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, in the earlier years of digital rights there was an 
emphasis on the relationship between the internet and the rights afforded by the ICCPR. 
However, starting in the twenty-first century as the demand for digital rights grew charters and 
conventions began to expand which rights are deemed related to cyberspace and the internet. In 
the case of the rights outlined in the ICCPR, the right to privacy has consistently remained a key 
component of digital rights. Similarly, minority rights (Article 27), freedom of expression 
(Article 19), and right to legal recourse (Article 2) are also repeatedly emphasized. Additionally, 
with each new charter increasingly more rights under both the ICCPR and the ICESCR are 
specifically named to warrant additional protections. 
Similarly, the rights afforded by the ICESCR have been increasingly incorporated in 
digital rights charters and conventions over time. Although not initially seen as related to digital  
rights, the last decade has seen the expansion of the scope of human rights considered to be 
digital rights. Most notably, the right to take part in cultural life and benefit from scientific 
progress (Article 15) and the rights of children (Article 10) are repeatedly recognized by digital 
rights charters. 
 As noted above, the division of digital rights along ICCPR and ICESCR lines may help to 
provide insight in their acceptance or rejection by states and subsequently international 
organizations. The incorporation of more ICESCR rights may aid in the acceptance of future 
cyber conventions by states which ratified the ICESCR. A government’s view on digital rights 
may influence its domestic cyber policies and willingness to ratify international treaties. Yet, as 
seen in the case of Russia in the Budapest Convention, this is not absolute. Regardless, the 
expansion of digital rights showcases the growing influence of technology on almost every facet 
of society.   
 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CYBER FREEDOM AND SECURITY 
 
 The level of importance placed on human rights on the international and national levels is 
directly related to the dominant ideologies of the world order and specific state contexts in which 
it exists. The current world order was forged from the aftermath of the Cold War which saw the 
United States as the unequivocal world hegemon. The American preponderance of power 
ensured that the liberal international organizations created during that time, and to some extent 
continue to be, a reflection of American liberal values. During this time, liberalism was the 
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dominant theory in international relations because it happened to be the ideology of the most 
powerful state at the time (Sterling-Folker, 2015). This sentiment carried on throughout the 
1990s which saw a drastic increase in the number of international organizations and 
preponderance of liberal values, including the importance of human rights.4 This can also be seen 
by the expansion of digital rights as norms, consistent with constructivist theories. Thus, the 
acceptance of digital rights as a norm is contingent upon the attitudes towards liberal values in a 
world order. If the norm is not sufficiently spread and accepted before a shift in the world order 
then that may hamper its legitimacy and strength, a situation that is now unfolding in China, 
Russia, and even democracies like India (Goel, 2019). 
 Although the post-Cold War world was best described as a liberal one, some theorists 
argue that liberal theory was hard-pressed to accurately explain it (Gleditsch, 2008). This critique 
also extends to the seeming degeneration of the liberal order today. The importance placed on 
liberal ideological values that advocated for the protection of individual sovereignty in order to 
benefit society are diminishing in a global society where emerging actors are not liberal or even 
democratic. The golden years of global governance are gone, replaced now with fragmented 
international organizations and gridlock on decisions of transnational issues, cybersecurity being 
one of them (Stephen, 2017). The emerging non-liberal, non-democratic powers—China being 
the most notable, but Russia should not be overlooked—do not subscribe to the liberal 
ideological characteristics of global governance, even if they do benefit from the existence of 
these institutions (Zhang, 2016). Yet, this does not mean the end of global governance 
necessarily. As explained by Stephen (2017), global governance may still occur but without the 
dissemination of liberal values. 
 Whether global governance without the promise of the protection of liberal values like 
human rights will result in rules and institutions that can effectively tackle the complex 
transnational issues of cybersecurity and human rights is unclear. In order to solve the global 
challenge of cybersecurity a “hardheaded assessment of which players really matter in getting to 
an acceptable answer and a process of bargaining to get them aligned” is required (Barma, 
Ratner and Weber, 2012:66). Yet, the range of perspectives on this issue at the national level 
between powerful states are diverse and often rooted in a state’s hierarchy of human rights. 
Therefore, to expect a consensus to be drawn in a world order where emerging actors do not 
champion traditional liberal norms is ill-timed.5 However, as Deudney and Ikenberry (2018) 
suggest, liberal democracies are remarkably robust and have faced and recovered from worse. 
They would advocate that if a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy is accomplished, 
then institutional innovations may emerge to adapt and respond to global challenges. 
 Despite previous interstate demonstrations of cyber capabilities, many nations did not 
view cybersecurity as a top priority national security until 2001. Days following the September 
11th attacks the Federal Bureau of Investigation warned of further possible attacks, including 
cyber terrorism (Spencer, 2002). The issue of cybersecurity then took on a different hue and 
debates ensued on the capabilities of cyberwarfare; would it equate to mass destruction, 
                                                          
4 Whether these institutions and the order of this time were truly liberal is debated (Barma, Ratner and Weber, 
2012). 
5 In 1998, fearing that information weapons would be on the same scale as weapons of mass destruction, 
Russia promoted a proposal to the UN to restrict what states can do with cyber weapons but was curtailed by 
the United States (Barmin et al., 2011). Even in the golden years of global governance and liberal values 
progress was not made on tackling cybersecurity which seems to suggest that Barma, Ratner, and Weber 
(2012) were right in their analysis. 
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trademarked by direct physical damage on infrastructure resulting in civilian casualties, or mass 
disruption, defined as the ability to change, delay, delete or redirect data in order to cause 
economic, social or political disorder. The last decade has witnessed sufficient proof for the case 
of mass disruption in the forms of the 2007 Estonian cyberattacks that resulted in the sporadic 
take down of banking systems, government communication, and media outlets and more recently 
the 2016 Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee and other democratic 
organizations (McGuinness, 2017; Diamond, 2016). However, although no cyberattack to date 
has resulted in the loss of life, political theorists like Deudney and Ikenberry (2018) are confident 
in the mass destruction capabilities of cyberwarfare—a  claim that can be supported by the 2010 
Stuxnet computer worm which is known as the first cyberattack to cause physical damage across 
international borders (Lindsay, 2013). Considering the current rapid pace of cyberspace 
potential, the next decade will be crucial in setting international norms. Although it is unlikely 
that a return to liberal fundamentals will reach the same level of international priority, 
deliberation, and collaboration as it did in the second half of the twentieth century within this 
timeframe, it is possible that the fear of the potential of cyberwarfare will bring all states to the 
negotiating table.  
 On the national level, the fear generated by the possibility of a cheaper and more 
accessible weapon of mass destruction could help to justify some states’ domestic cyber policies. 
Yet, this excuse could be used in order to justify limits on human rights related to the internet 
when in actuality a state’s domestic cyber policies are implemented to maintain political 
stability. This theme will be explored in later sections. Regardless, according to Keohane (2002), 
a government’s first task is to protect their people, thus policies that prioritize national security 
over individual sovereignty are acceptable. Furthermore, an argument can be made that 
modernized states are the most vulnerable to cyberattacks due to a reliance on technology to 
sustain fundamental systems like infrastructure and power grids which provides both economic 
and social stability to a state. For these reasons, it is not surprising that some emerging states, 
and even the United States, sometimes subscribe to domestic policies that place national security 
over citizens’ derogable human rights. However, this alone does not explain the approach of 
some modern regional powers. For example, Germany and other western European countries 
have implemented domestic policies that serve to protect digital rights. The hypotheses provided 
in the former section of this thesis will attempt to explain this divergence, that is the existence 
and protection of these practices as rights relates to levels of transparency and political stability 
in a state. 
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China 
I.  DOMESTIC CYBER POLICIES 
“As in the real world, freedom and order are both necessary in cyberspace: Freedom is what 
order is meant for, and order is the guarantee for freedom. We should respect internet users’ 
rights to exchange ideas and express their minds and we should also build good order in 
cyberspace in accordance with [the] law as it will help protect the legitimate rights and interests 
of all internet users” (Phillips, 2015). 
 -President Xi Jinping at the Opening Ceremony of the Second World Internet Conference, 2015. 
 China registered to become the 71st country on the global computer network and received 
CN as the “highest level domain name” in 1994, however it was not until January of 1995 that 
the 64K special lines were put into operation that internet access services began to be offered to 
the public (Shahbaz, 2018; Cnnic.com.cn, 2012). China experienced unprecedented expansion of 
internet use after realizing “the significance of computer information in its economic 
development and encouraged fast development of Internet in commercial use to embrace the new 
information era” (Liang and Lu, 2010:104-105). An indication of this tremendous expansion is 
the increase of internet users over the years. The Chinese Internet Network Information Center 
(CNNIC) reported approximately two million users in 1998, more than 100 million in 2005, and 
surpassed 298 million by the end of 2008, exceeding the number of internet users in the United 
States (Liang and Lu, 2010). As of December 2017, the total number of internet users in China 
reached 771.98 million (Statista, 2017). 
 With such a massive internet user base, the effect of cyber policies is especially 
imperative to widespread human rights violations or protections. In the case of China, internet 
development accompanied “the government’s tight control and regulation over Internet 
infrastructure, its commercial and social use, and its potential political ramifications” (Liang and 
Lu, 2010:104). Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution gives citizens of the People’s Republic of 
China freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration (CHINA, 
1983). Yet, media regulations undermine these rights by allowing authorities to crack down on 
news stories that “expose state secrets and endanger the country” (Xu and Albert, 2017). Indeed, 
the protection of national sovereignty is regularly used as an argument to censor information 
deemed harmful to Chinese political or economic interests and surveil and punish both citizens 
within and outside the country, as well as foreign journalists, activists, and NGOs inside of 
mainland China. In fact, China is regularly reported as the worst abuser of internet freedom 
according to Freedom House (Shahbaz, 2018). 
 Various laws/regulations (see Table 3.1) outline under what conditions different online 
activities and information are deemed illegal. The culmination of these conditions, as stated in 
Article 19 of the Provisions on the Administration of Internet New Information Services 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005), are the following:  
(1) violating the basic principles as they are confirmed in the Constitution; 
(2) jeopardizing the security of the nation, divulging state secrets, subverting of the 
national regime or jeopardizing the integrity of the nation’s unity; 
(3) harming the honor of the interests of the nation; 
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(4) inciting hatred against peoples, racism against peoples, or disrupting the solidarity of 
peoples; 
(5) disrupting national policies on religion, propagating evil cults and feudal 
superstitions; 
(6) spreading rumors, disturbing social order, or disrupting social stability; 
(7) spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, terror, or abetting the 
commission of a crime; 
(8) insulting or defaming third parties, infringing on the legal rights and interests of 
third parties; 
(9) inciting illegal assemblies, associations, marches, demonstrations, or gatherings that 
disturb social order; 
(10) conducting activities in the name of an illegal civil organization; and 
(11) any other content prohibited by law or rules.  
These conditions either directly relate to or are the foundation that results in policies that 
both violate and protect multiple digital rights. On one hand, these conditions seem to ensure the 
protection of various rights like minority rights (4) and the rights of children (7). Regarding the 
former, this condition seems to imply that citizens may not directly inflame racism or hatred 
against peoples. However, this does not hold true for state-sponsored racist policies like the 
detainment of over an estimated one million Uighurs in Xinjiang province. Furthermore, an 
argument can be made that this condition does not have the fifty-five recognized minority groups 
in mind, but rather is equally applicable against minorities in order to protect the Han majority. 
Alternatively, the majority of these conditions allow for the violation of freedom of expression 
(2, 6), freedom of privacy (2,3) which affects the right to information, freedom of religion (5), 
freedom of association (9), freedom of assembly (9), and the right to political participation 
(1,6,10). Policies use these conditions as guidelines which legalizes varying degrees of state 
surveillance and censorship. 
However, prior to these conditions a national project was already underway to protect the 
state from the feared democratic influence of the internet. In 1998, the Golden Shield Project, 
now more commonly known as the Great Firewall of China, was launched by the Ministry of 
Public Security. What has been referred to as the world’s largest firewall is a combined 
censorship and surveillance project that utilizes firewalls, internet registration, keyword filtering, 
bandwidth throttling, and government controls on website access in order to establish a cyber 
boundary around the Chinese internet (Qiu, 2000; Xu and Albert, 2017; Whiting, 2008). The 
main function of this ongoing project is to censor and control information on the internet on both 
the domestic and global level (Dowell, 2006). Despite previously being relatively easy to 
circumvent through the use of virtual private networks (VPN), Freedom House reported in their 
2018 Freedom on the Net report that “the [Chinese] government took new measures to restrict 
the use of circumvention tools to bypass blocking and filtering; Apple complied by removing 
hundreds of virtual private network services from its online app store” (Freedom House, 2018a). 
Even foreign companies operating within mainland China are conceding to recent pressure to 
stop aiding in the circumvention of domestic cyber policies that restrict digital rights. 
The level of online censorship and surveillance, although consistently among the strictest 
worldwide, has fluctuated over the years. This is in part due to the often vague nature of the 
legislature which allows for quick changes in policies and different interpretations. Internet users 
and business owners are particularly vulnerable to this legislative breadth and vigor which holds 
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them in “constant fear and therefore strengthens their self-censorship” (Liang and Lu, 2010:109). 
A possible cause for what Council of Foreign Affairs Senior Fellow Elizabeth C. Economy calls 
a state of “schizophrenia” in regard to Chinese media policy could be the realization that China 
needs to allow citizens to enjoy some freedom of press, but fears the repercussions which may 
lead to a demand for more rights (Xu and Albert, 2017). The most recent show of the fluctuation 
of online control has occurred since President Xi Jinping came into power. Under the now 
permanent rule of President Xi, “censorship of all forms of media has tightened” (Xu and Albert, 
2017). This is best exemplified by two new major domestic policies that went into effect in 2017: 
the Cybersecurity Law and the National Intelligence Law (see Table 3.1). The former drastically 
strengthens online censorship and is the “latest step in China’s long-term campaign for 
jurisdictional control over content on the internet” (Wagner, 2017). Although this idea of internet 
sovereignty, defined as the principle that states should have complete control over the internet 
within their domain, formally dates back to the 2010 government white papers and long-running 
projects like the Golden Shield project, it is now being reinvigorated and fortified. Since this law 
came into effect, censorship activity increased by over 40 percent between 2016 and 2017 
(Patrick and Feng, 2018). WeChat, a Chinese multi-purpose application with over one billion 
active users, has seen an increase in arrests since the Cybersecurity Law came into effect (Jao, 
2018). In fact, individuals within mainland China have been arrested for the content of their 
private messages in WeChat (Dou, 2017). The latter of these laws, although characterized as 
defensive, is seen by others as an offensive obligation to participate in surveillance, and thus 
consequently increases censorship. This is done through Article 7 which states that “any 
organization or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work according 
to law” (Girard, 2019). An average of nearly one new directive every two days has followed in 
the wake of these two laws in order to further “fine-tune” the dos and do nots of online activity 
(Shahbaz, 2018). 
With new directives and regulations comes the potential for further effects on human 
rights. A current nationwide project called the Social Credit System (SCS) is a result of 
increasing surveillance. Described by author Luo Peixin (2018:3) in Social Credit Law: 
Principles, Rules and Cases, the SCS is “a management system that takes big data as its basis, is 
supported by technological capacities, and is back by law; it is an important modern method to 
forward the country’s governance systems and management capabilities.” Construction plans for 
the SCS were first announced in 2014 and is planned to launch a full roll out in 2020 (Hatton, 
2015). This system accounts for citizens’ on and offline behaviors and rates their trustworthiness 
which then determines what opportunities, or lack thereof, a citizen has in life. For example, 
those with bad ratings may be banned from air and rail travel and those with good ratings may 
benefit from waived deposits at hotels and expedited security access (Shahbaz, 2018). In addition 
to violations of privacy and expression, the SCS has also been accused of violating the right to 
movement, thus expanding the scope of human rights affected by internet policies. 
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Table 3.1 China Major Laws and Regulations 
Law/Regulation Date 
Promulgated  
Purpose 
Criminal Law of the  
People’s Republic of  
China 
 
March 1997 Outlines what constitutes a crime by category of 
endangerment of national security, endangerment of 
public security, and disruption of the socialist market 
economy. Later amendments criminalize cybercrimes. 
Measures on the 
Administration of Security 
Protection of the  
International Networking of 
Computer Information  
Networks 
December 
1997 
Strengthens the security protection of the international 
networking of information networks and maintains public 
order and social stability by outlining what online 
activities are banned by use of international networking. 
Measures on the  
Administration of Internet 
Information Services 
September 
2000 
Regulates Internet information services activities by 
requiring internet information services to obtain a patent 
through the government to provide services. 
Regulations on 
Telecommunications of the 
People’s Republic of China 
September 
2000 
Regulates the order of the telecommunications market and 
extends prior regulations to include voice, text, data, 
images and any other information using wire or wireless 
systems.  
Provisions on the  
Administration of Electronic 
Bulletin Services via the 
Internet 
November 
2000  
Regulates the content, retention period, and genre of 
electronic bulletin services. 
Decision of the National  
People’s Congress Standing 
Committee on Safeguarding 
Internet Security 
December 
2000 
Defines how the internet should be used in order to 
promote a healthy development of China’s interests. 
Provisions on the  
Administration of Foreign- 
Invested 
Telecommunications 
Enterprises 
December 
2001 
Requires partially foreign-invested and foreign enterprises 
to follow national laws/regulations to conduct business in 
China. 
Provisions on the 
Administration of Internet  
News Information Services 
September 
2005 
Regulates Internet news information services in a way to 
safeguard national security and the public interest. No 
foreign-invested or wholly foreign news venture can 
establish an Internet news information service. 
Cybersecurity Law June 2017 Centralizes internet policy and obliges internet companies 
operating in China to censor users’ content, restricts 
online anonymity, and localizes personal data in China. 
National Intelligence Law July 2017 Obliges individuals, organizations, and institutions to 
assist Public Security and State Security officials by 
spying and reporting on each other. Gives the Chinese 
government access to any data on social media. 
Sources: (Amnesty International 2018; Girard, 2018; Shahbaz, 2018; [NPC Standing 
Committee, 2000; Freedom House, 2018a) 
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II. INTERNATIONAL STANCE 
 Freedom and order, while seemingly at odds in realist and liberal theoretical frameworks 
in international relations, have a symbiotic relationship in the eyes of the Chinese government on 
both the national and international level. As Zhang discusses, despite advocating for realist 
trademarks like order and state sovereignty, China does not reject the international organizations 
that have developed from a liberal order due to its current hierarchical ranking in these 
institutions. Now that the liberal order is declining, China affirms the importance of order in 
general to tame chaos that would presumably ensue otherwise, yet the type of order is not yet 
clear. Considering the antagonist stance China has taken towards digital rights domestically 
despite condemnation from international organizations and NGOs, China may aim to avoid 
liberal solidarism. Instead, China pushes for a liberal pluralist order which still maintains 
international organizations but upholds the importance of national sovereignty against what it 
perceives to be the current priority for rights and democracy. In order to facilitate this, China 
must first normalize their own approach to digital rights so that a future order could not condemn 
rights that are not recognized. 
When confronted by other states, particularly the United States, and international 
organizations about its human rights record, China often counters by exposing the tainted human 
rights records of other nations. This can be seen since 1998 when the Chinese government began 
issuing a publication entitled Human rights record of the United States in response to U.S. 
pointed criticisms of Chinese policies (Zhang, 2016). By doing so China is both standing firm in 
its own treatment of digital rights but also delegitimizing the United States’ arguments based on 
U.S. hypocrisy. 
In addition to fighting back against condemnation, China is also taking the initiative to 
promote its own digital rights agenda, including internet sovereignty. According to the 2018 
Freedom on the Net report, the Chinese government hosted two to three week “training camps” 
for media officials from multiple countries to teach about its own censorship and surveillance 
systems (Shahbaz, 2018). President Xi publicly laid out a national plan to transform China into a 
“cyber superpower” and presented China’s domestic cyber policies as “a new option for other 
countries and nations that want to speed up their development while preserving their 
independence” (Shahbaz, 2018). Staying true to this promise Chinese firms already provided 
“high-tech tools of surveillance to governments that lack respect for human rights” (Shahbaz, 
2018). This has proven to be a mutually beneficial project in the case of Zimbabwe where China 
is receiving biometric data of millions of Zimbabweans without their consent in order to train 
artificial intelligence programs to recognize darker skin tones. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, also known as One Belt One Road, has attracted 
international attention as a massive global infrastructure project but the “Information Silk Road” 
(National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of 
Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 2015). that comes with it is not as well-known. 
This project has been described by Council of Foreign Affairs scholars Stewart M. Patrick and 
Ashley Feng (2018) as China’s attempt “to export its policy of authoritarian cyber controls, 
giving countries the right to regulate and censor their own internet.” In order to accomplish this 
goal the Chinese government is laying transcontinental and cross-border optical cables, 
effectively undermining previous global internet and telecommunications infrastructures. As a 
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result, global data is more vulnerable to the surveilling and censoring of Chinese intelligence 
agencies (Shahbaz, 2018). 
These international actions seem consistent with Chinese domestic policies in their 
treatment of digital rights. China’s international cyber stance can be perceived as an attempt to 
construct and disseminate a norm that calls for the subservient status of digital rights and more 
generally human rights to global and domestic order. By making this a global norm, China would 
no longer be subject to oft criticism from regulatory bodies and the international community. 
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Russia 
I. DOMESTIC CYBER POLICIES 
“Propaganda of drugs and violence, human trafficking and child pornography—that’s the 
reality of today’s Internet” (Ognyanova, 2015). 
-Article written by Jury Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow in 2004. 
 Russia has a long, complicated history with information. In the days of the Soviet Union, 
information and the media were so tightly controlled to the point that the ownership and use of 
photocopiers was regulated by the state (CEU School of Public Policy, 2017). This long-term use 
of state control of information may contribute to the current attitude of Russian citizens toward 
internet censorship; 60 percent of Russians believe that the banning of certain website and 
materials is necessary, according to a 2016 poll conducted by the Levada Center, a Russian 
independent, non-governmental polling firm (Taylor, 2016). Indeed, according to Nathalie 
Maréchal (2017) in her article Networked Authoritarianism and the Geopolitics of Information: 
Understanding Russian Internet Policy, many Russians think the internet is dangerous and 
threatening. 
This fear is then often fanned by the Russian government and political class to portray the 
internet as “unreliable, biased, and dangerous” to Russia’s 98.8 million internet users 
(Ognyanova, 2015; Maréchal, 2017; Statista, 2019). The 1990s witnessed a brief relief in 
restrictions of freedom of press before the government was seized by a new oligarch class which 
in turn justified President Vladimir Putin’s “liberation” of media from oligarchs to state control 
when he assumed office in 1999 (Maréchal, 2017). Since then, the internet has been under tight 
state control. However, unlike China, Russia has rarely relied on obstacles to access, such as 
infrastructural barriers and application level blocking, but instead on censorship, fear, and 
intimidation (Maréchal, 2017). Katherine Ognyanova (2015) recognizes one mechanism that 
allows the Russian state to control the media, which is increasingly dependent on the internet, as 
the selective application of unrelated laws including: “building codes, tax laws, criminal laws, 
and intellectual property laws” (Maréchal, 2017:31). 
According to the 2018 Freedom on the Net report, various articles in the Russian criminal 
code establish penalties for nine specific activities:  
“general defamation (Article 128.1 of the criminal code), defamation against a judge or 
prosecutor (Article 298.1), insulting the authorities (Article 319), calls for terrorism 
(Article 205.1), insulting religious feelings (Article 148), calls for extremism (Article 
280), calls for separatism (Article 280.1), and incitement of hatred (Article 
282)…spreading false information on the activities of the Soviet Union in World War II 
(Article 354.1)” (Freedom House, 2018c). 
 Furthermore, the Russian administrative code establishes penalties for two additional 
activities: “displaying Nazi symbols or symbols of organizations deemed extremist” (Article 20.3 
of the administrative code) and “the dissemination of extremist materials” (Article 20.29 of the 
administrative code) (Freedom House, 2018c). According to these laws, the digital rights most 
directly at risk are freedoms of expression (of which, freedom of speech is granted by the 
Russian constitution), religion, and political participation, which then more indirectly puts the 
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rights to privacy, assembly, fair trial, and association at risk. This has resulted in Russia’s 
consistently poor ranking and scores in international indices for freedom of expression: 
Reporters without Borders ranks Russia 148/180, 1 being the best and 180 being the worst, in the 
2018 World Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders, 2018). In Freedom House’s 2017 
Freedom of the Press report Russia ranked 83/100, where 1 is the best and 100 the worst 
(Freedom House, 2017). This then translates to Russia’s current 67/100 score in Freedom 
House’s 2018 Freedom on the Net report. 
Within further laws and regulations, the justification of extremist content online is most 
frequently used to validate censorship, imprisonment, and death. For example, the Russian 
website Russiangate was blocked by Roskomnadzor (a Russian media regulator) for purported 
“extremist content” a few hours after Russiangate published a report about an investigation of 
real estate holdings for Alexander Bortnikov, the FSB (internal intelligence service) chief 
(Schreck, 2018). In another case, Dmitry Popkov, the editor-in-chief of an independent local 
newspaper called Ton-M in Siberia that often reports on abuses of power and corruption, was 
murdered. Russian authorities deny responsibility (CPJ, 2017). The Bloggers Law, explained in 
Table 4.1, is one recent example of a Russian law that legalizes and facilitates the violation of 
digital rights.  Russian actions can be accomplished by the purposefully vague nature defined in 
laws which can be interpreted to include content that other countries would consider harmless 
(Maréchal, 2017). Freedom House identifies removal-worthy content, according to Russia, to 
including “LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex) expression, information on 
the conflict in Ukraine, and material related to the political opposition,” the last of which seems 
to apply to the aforementioned two examples (Freedom House, 2018c). 
Website black-listing is a common tool of the Russian government for censorship. The 
number of affected websites has steadily increased over the years—between 2012 and 2013 
federal legal amendments gave Roskomnadzor and other agencies authority to make decisions 
regarding what content warrants a website to be blocked. Roskomnadzor maintains a list of 
blocked websites which authorities claim contain child abuse imagery, drug-related content, 
information about suicide, copyright infringements, information about juvenile victims of crime, 
and calls for public actions or rallies (Maréchal, 2017; Freedom House, 2018c). Similar to 
Chinese censorship, Russia also portrays taking the high-ground of protecting the rights of 
children to justify reassertion of state control over internet content. Unlike China, the protection 
of gender equality rights is not a main argument for censorship. In fact, images of Anna 
Zhavnerovich, a Moscow woman who was severely injured due to domestic violence, were 
disseminated online and some internet users celebrated the violence against women (James and 
Jones, 2017).6 This type of censorship is upheld by internet service providers (ISP) who must 
refer to Roskomnadzor’s blacklist and who are encouraged to overestimate the reach of blocking 
orders in order to avoid the consequences of heavy fines and loss of state licenses for reason of 
under-censoring (Maréchal, 2017). In addition, ISPs have no legal specification on how to 
restrict access resulting in accidental blockings. Consequently, 97 percent of accidental 
blockings were caused by ISPs blocking according to IP addresses instead of domain name or 
website URLs (Freedom House, 2018c). 
                                                          
6 Though it is important to note that this could also be interpreted as a push in the right direction for gender 
equality in Russia because of Zhavnerovich’s decision to come forward and shame her ex-boyfriend despite 
online harassment. 
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Table 4.1 Russia Major Laws and Regulations 
Law/Regulation Date 
Promulgated  
Purpose/Relevance 
Foreign Agents Law 
 
July 2012 Registered NGOs that receive some foreign funding and 
engage in activities deemed political are subject to audits 
and are marked as a foreign agent in official statements. 
Smears organizations that are critical of the Russian 
government. 
Law on Information, 
Information Technology and 
Information Security  
(amendments) 
 
February 
2014  
Allows blocking of websites that instigate riots, extremist 
or terrorist actions without a trial. Extends the overreach 
of the original law which fought child pornography. 
Newest amendment requires foreign internet services to 
store user data in Russia. 
Bloggers Law August 
2014 
All online outlets including blogs and personal pages with 
social networking site with more than 3,000 daily readers 
must register with Roskomnadzor (mass media regulator). 
Law on Mass Media 
(amendments) 
January 
2016  
Prohibits foreign nationals and organizations from owning 
more than a twenty-percent stake in any Russian media 
outlet. 
Law on News Aggregators January 
2017 
Requires internet search engines with more than one 
million daily users to check truthfulness of information 
deemed publicly important before dissemination. News 
deemed false must be removed from websites or face 
financial penalties which leads to self-censorship in 
private companies and the free flow of online information. 
Yarovaya Law 
(package of amendments) 
July 2018 Obliges online services to provide encryption keys to the 
internet, requires telecommunications providers to hold 
records for six months and provide any information that is 
federally requested, introduces prison terms of up to seven 
years for calling for or justifying terrorism online. Limits 
citizens’ privacy and ability to express political dissent. 
Sources: (Freedom House, 2018c; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Article 19, 2017; Freedom 
House, 2017) 
 Not all Russian citizens remain complicit in digital authoritarianism, particularly after a 
steady worsening of their internet freedoms over the course of the last six years (Freedom House, 
2018c).  Russian internet penetration has increased in recent years, meanwhile an increasing 
number of citizens are growing restless and fighting back against censorship and surveillance, 
particularly following the government’s move to block the telecommunication app Telegram for 
refusing to provide encryption keys to the FSB in April, 2017 (Freedom House, 2018c). 
Thousands took to the streets and a “Digital Resistance” formed to support digital rights, 
particularly the right to the internet (Aleksejeva, 2018). Concurrently, stricter laws were passed 
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to restrict online anonymity, specifically by blocking VPNs and requiring other 
telecommunication apps to link users to their personal information according to a 2018 
amendment to the Law on Information, Information Technology and Information Security (see 
Table 4.1). 
 Russia’s System of Operational-Investigatory Measures (SORM), a surveillance 
technology used to provide intelligence agencies with telecommunications content, was also 
expanded in April 2015 to incorporate deep packet inspection (DPI) technology. This update 
provides greater access and searching capabilities of online communications, such as social 
media platforms, to intelligence agents (Freedom House, 2018c). The information that is 
collected and stored for long-term use includes recordings and locations (Soldatov and Borogan, 
2013). Although the European Court for Human Rights deemed SORM in violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the 2015 court case Zakharov v. Russia, SORM added 
more classified regulations that continue to affect all ISPs in Russia (Zakharov v. Russia, 
[2015]). 
 Rumors of an internet “kill switch” have emerged following Russian cyber exercises that 
revealed vulnerabilities in “RuNet’s security infrastructure preparedness against potential 
external aggression” (Nocetti, 2015:5). This kill switch would allow the Russian government to 
shut down the internet in Russia and could be used at the government’s discretion. This implies 
that should large-scale civil protests break out, the Russian authorities would be able to 
undermine them by blocking access to the internet. These types of internet shutdowns have 
already been used by the governments of Egypt, Uganda, and Iran, in an effort to control 
information regarding politically sensitive events (DeNardis, 2014). Besides violations of 
political participation rights, an internet shutdown has far-reaching consequences on the 
freedoms of expression, movement, and work (AccessNow, 2019). Despite a UN Security 
Council meeting where Russia reassured members that no such kill switch exists in Russia, its 
existence is not unheard of in other countries. Additionally, the strengthening of Russia’s state 
internet control does not rule out the possibility of such a project becoming reality in the future 
(Nocetti, 2015).  
II. INTERNATIONAL STANCE 
 In 2014, President Vladimir Putin said the internet was a project of the CIA and is “still 
developing as such” (Kelley, 2014). Given the deep mistrust Putin has of the United States and 
its foreign policies, or arguably his desire to foment anti-U.S. sentiment within Russia, this is not 
an entirely unexpected accusation. Moreover, the United States’ computer network beat out the 
Soviet Union’s OGAS due to political infighting and became the internet that we all know today 
(Baraniuk, 2016). Naturally, this gave U.S. companies the advantage by allowing them to control 
large portions of the internet (Zimmer, 2017). This undoubtedly feeds into the paranoia of the 
former KGB spy who is now aiming to make Runet, the Russian internet, independent (Matsakis, 
2019).  
 Russia’s apparent goal of a fully autonomous internet took its first step with the newest 
amendment to the Law on Information, Information Technology and Information Technology 
which plans to create a Russian collection of national intranets separate from the current 
globally-interconnected World Wide Web (Kelley, 2014). Much like the Chinese Information 
26 
 
Silk Road, Russia’s ambition poses a threat to current global infrastructure which in turn could 
affect the implementation of digital rights. 
 How these rights would be affected may be inferred based on Russia’s involvement in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This organization was founded in 2001 and is 
comprised of Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, India, and Tajikistan 
and currently has four observing states: Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia (Albert, 2015; 
Michel, 2017). It is the Russian government’s relationship with China within the SCO that is 
most telling of Russia’s international stance towards digital rights; their combined effort is being 
used within this framework to aid member states in becoming better at “networked 
authoritarianism” (Maréchal, 2017). This is then compounded with the SCO advocation of 
restricting the flow of information that falls into three categories: terrorism, extremism, and 
separatism. As described above, extremism is often a blanket reason applied to any form of 
opposition online and thus results in policies that infringe on digital rights. Furthermore, the SCO 
advocates for the “preventing [of] other nations from using their core technologies to destabilise 
[sic] economic, social and political stability and security” (Kizekova, 2012:2). All these appear 
to be indicators that the Russian stance towards global digital rights mirrors its own domestic 
stance—one of censorship and surveillance. The implication mirrors those discussed in the China 
section: the construction and dissemination of a norm that called for the avoidance of criticism 
and devaluation of digital rights. 
  Under the leadership of Putin, Russia’s global and domestic stances on digital rights 
remain consistent. An original rival to U.S. internet supremacy, Russia will no doubt continue to 
undermine and advocate for the deterioration global internet infrastructures and digital rights in 
order to assert its own digital sovereignty. Interference in the United States’ 2016 presidential 
election exemplifies Russia’s ability to not only shake global confidence in the internet and 
cyberspace—a feeling still shared by many Russian citizens—but also serves as a justification 
for the implementation of “networked authoritarianism” by a state to protect its citizens from 
such interferences. 
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United States 
I. DOMESTIC CYBER POLICIES 
“The final freedom, one that was probably inherent in what both President and Mrs. Roosevelt 
thought about and wrote about all those years ago, is… the freedom to connect – the idea that 
governments should not prevent people from connecting to the internet, to websites, or to each 
other. The freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in cyberspace.” 
-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement on internet freedom on January 21st, 2010. 
 The right to freedoms of speech and press are protected by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution. In 1997, the landmark Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union Supreme Court case 
unanimously reaffirmed that the First Amendment extends to protect online speech (Reno v. 
ACLU, [1997]). This decision rendered the 1996 Communications Decency Act, the first notable 
attempt to regulate the dissemination of online pornographic material, unconstitutional and set 
the precedent for future debates on online censorship (US Legal, 2019). As such, lower courts 
have over the years repeatedly struck down attempts to regulate online content. Consequently, 
Freedom House has consistently rated the United States as free in their yearly Freedom on the 
Net reports which commenced in 2011. Yet, the United States’ internet freedom score has 
increased from 13 to 22 from 2011 to 2018, indicating an overall worsening trend in internet 
freedom. 
 There is no singular federal regulatory body for the internet in the United States, nor is 
internet infrastructure state-owned. Private telecommunication companies such as Verizon, 
AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile7 own and maintain infrastructure, allowing for multiple connection 
points. Not only does this make the possibility of internet shutdowns highly unlikely, it serves as 
a protective layer for citizens against spontaneous government censorship of political and social 
content. However, laws governing other aspects of civil life have increasingly been extended to 
the internet including: copyright violations, child pornography, content deemed “harmful” to 
minors, gambling, and financial crimes (Freedom House, 2011). Of these listed, child 
pornography and “harmful content” for minors have garnered the most legislative attention, in 
turn stirring debate over how far freedom of speech applies. The three most influential laws 
regarding this subject are the 1996 Communications Decency Act, 1998 Child Protection Act, 
and 2001 Children’s Internet Protection Act (see Table 5.1). Of the three, the first two were 
struck down for being unconstitutional for violating the freedom of speech provisions of the First 
Amendment. However, the latter was upheld in 2003 due to its limited scope of implementation, 
namely only in public libraries. 
 
 
                                                          
7 A T-Mobile and Sprint merger is in the works, however it is just as unlikely as likely to actually occur. 
(Cheng, 2019). 
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Table 5.1 United States Major Laws and Regulations 
Law/Regulation Date 
Promulgated  
Purpose/Relevance 
Executive Order 
12333 
December 
1981 
Laid the foundation for how the NSA and other federal agencies may 
conduct surveillance of the population within the United States. 
Authorizes the collection of Americans’ metadata and communication 
content when collected “incidentally.” Used as justification for PRISM 
and the MYSTIC program which was used to document all outgoing and 
incoming calls from target countries.   
Patriot Act October 
2001 
Broadens the use of wiretapping devices from telephone numbers to 
internet and e-mail origins, without prior warrant requirement so long as 
the information to be obtained is likely relevant to the investigation 
against international terrorism. Broadens the definition of terrorism to 
include domestic terrorism. 
Children’s Internet 
Protection Act 
December 
2001 
Requires libraries and some schools to install content filtering software on 
their computers in order to block access to certain content, including: 
pornography and bomb-making recipes. The software unintentionally 
blocks various other kinds of speech, including: comedy, personal care, 
short poems, and health sites. 
Homeland Security 
Act 
November 
2002 
Establishes the Department of Homeland Security. Gives authority to the 
secretary of Homeland Security to direct and control investigations the 
require information to investigate and prevent terrorism. 
Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism 
Prevention Act 
December 
2004 
Established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to oversee 
the intelligence community. Section 6001 amends the definition of agent 
of a foreign power in the FISA to add a “lone wolf” provision referring to 
a foreign national who engages in international terrorism. Thus, easing the 
process to apply for a court order.  
Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act 
(FISA) Amendment 
Act 
July 2008 Gives the NSA the ability to collect users’ communications data along 
with its content from U.S. tech companies and through physical 
infrastructure. Allows for the direct authorization of mass surveillance of 
foreign nationals and the indirect mass surveillance of U.S. citizen 
communications. 
USA FREEDOM 
Act 
June 2015 An extension of the expiring provisions of the Patriot Act without 
significant changes to mass surveillance practices. However, limits what 
can be done with U.S. citizens’ information in court and federal 
proceedings when the NSA does not follow existing procedures. Also 
limits bulk collection of Americans’ phone records under Section 215.  
Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing 
Act 
December 
2015 
Protects U.S. companies from being sued for violating user privacy when 
disclosing information to federal agencies. Requires the Department of 
Homeland Security to tell private companies’ information about threats. 
Criticized for not clearly defining when the use of data can be used for 
cybersecurity or law enforcement purposes.  
Clarifying Lawful 
Overseas Use of 
Data Act (CLOUD) 
March 
2018 
Updates the 1986 Stored Communications Act by clarifying how to 
govern transnational data transfer. Expands the scope of law enforcement 
access to user data by legitimizing law enforcement requests sent to U.S. 
companies regardless if the data is stored within or outside the country. 
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Allow States and 
Victims to Fight 
Online Sex 
Trafficking Act 
April 
2018 
Cracks down on websites that promote prostitution and sex trafficking 
which has led to the preemptive censoring of legitimate content by 
companies in order to avoid penalties. 
Sources: (Gellman and Soltani, 2014; Homeland Security Act of 2002; Bazan, 2004; Butler, 
2015; Keane and Swire, 2018; Freedom House, 2018d)  
 The United States’ relatively lax stance on censorship, while beneficial to some digital 
freedoms like those of assembly, association, speech, and press, facilitates the near violation of 
others, specifically gender equality and minority rights. Without stringent regulations, the issue 
of websites promoting prostitution or sex trafficking, where the majority of victims are female, 
has emerged. Although this may not be strictly considered a violation of their rights, the 
disparate impact on women is important to note. Moreover, a study conducted by Amnesty 
International found that 33 percent of female internet users between the ages of 18 and 55 
experienced online abuse or harassment at least once (Amnesty International, 2017). The Pew 
Research Center found that a quarter of African-Americans have been targeted and harassed 
online due to their race or ethnicity. Similarly, 10 percent of Latinx individuals also faced racial-
targeted harassment compared to only 3 percent of white Americans (Duggan, 2017). While acts 
of harassment may not constitute a violation of minority rights, the incitement of racial tensions 
online may lead to escalated racial tensions offline. 
The Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (see Table 5.1) was 
signed into law in 2018 with a primary purpose of prosecuting such websites. However, once 
again, critiques emerged to argue that companies will preemptively censor legitimate content to 
avoid penalties, thus undermining freedoms of press and speech (Freedom House, 2018d).  
An even greater concern in recent years to digital rights in the United States is net 
neutrality, referring to the regulation of internet infrastructure so that network service providers 
must treat internet traffic equally. Because internet infrastructure is owned mainly by private 
telecommunication companies in the United States, if net neutrality is foregone, then an 
emergence of a pay-to-play business model is expected to emerge. This would mean ISPs would 
be able to control the speed in which certain websites operate, thus providing preference to those 
who are able to pay more. 
This concern was then legitimized when the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), the leading quasi-regulatory internet body in the United States, voted in December 2017 
to overturn provisions related to net neutrality in the 2015 Open Internet Order (Freedom House, 
2018d). This move received harsh criticisms from open internet advocates and think tanks who 
claim that without net neutrality protections internet users and access to information will be 
adversely affected. In response, states like California are enacting their own net neutrality laws 
despite threats of federal lawsuits (Kelly, 2018). 
Perhaps the most infamous of United States’ domestic cyber policies, revealed by the 
2013 Snowden leaks, is the prevalence of cyber intelligence gathering on its own citizens. 
Authorized by the Patriot Act in 2001 and further expanded upon by Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, surveillance of both U.S. and 
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non-U.S. citizens became commonplace (see Table 5.1). Two types of surveillance emerged: 
upstream and downstream. The former refers to the collecting of communications as they travel 
through infrastructure and the latter, infamously exemplified by PRISM, refers to the collection 
of communications from multinational technology companies like Google, Facebook, and 
Yahoo, often times through force (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2019). The Snowden 
Revelations incited international uproar due to their scope; any U.S. and non-U.S. citizen within 
or outside of the country who is believed to have communications to or from any foreigner with 
foreign intelligence information, regardless of how vaguely interpreted, is potentially subject to 
surveillance. Critics like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an international non-profit digital 
rights advocacy group, were quick to point out that not only do these practices undermine users’ 
right to privacy, they also undermine fundamental legal rights, including the Fourth Amendment 
which protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.  
Following these revelations public outcry led to subsequent policies to marginally curtail 
mass surveillance. One of such policies is the 2015 USA FREEDOM Act which extended 
provisions of the Patriot Act under the condition to limit the bulk collection of Americans’ phone 
records (Shahbaz, 2018). Despite this attempt, long-term distrust of government surveillance 
coupled with earlier explanations of online harassment has led internet users to practice self-
censorship. Reminders of mass surveillance especially effect users’ willingness to express 
minority public opinions online, according the 2018 United States Freedom on the Net Report 
(Freedom House, 2018d).  
The history of censorship in the United States presents three models to different 
censorship scenarios and their effects on digital rights. First, prior to 2013 when citizens of the 
United States were unaware of mass governmental surveillance, general freedoms of speech, 
press, and assembly were at their peak. Albeit this is at the expense of gender, child, and 
minority rights which then diminished these groups’ freedom of expression due to self-
censorship. Second, after the public became aware of mass surveillance, a decline in freedom of 
expression and assembly was witnessed as described in the previous paragraph. Third, in the 
same vein, mass surveillance itself violates the digital rights to privacy, expression, and 
association by limiting anonymity, but in turn protects marginalized groups because of self-
censorship and regulation of disinformation and hate speech. For that reason, surveillance and a 
completely open internet are double-edged swords. The former is not intrinsically repressive, nor 
is the latter wholly egalitarian in the case of the United States. 
 
II. INTERNATIONAL STANCE 
At the turn of the century, U.S. President Bill Clinton embraced the proliferation of the 
internet as a tool in which “liberty will be spread by cell phone and cable modern” (Griffiths, 
2018). The United States took the lead in the West, emphasizing the importance of the internet 
and digital rights in advancing democracy and liberal values. Indeed, the internet’s ability to 
allow users access to vast amounts of information is often cited as a defining factor for the 
democratization of states (Bimber, 2003; Freyburg et al., 2011; Schimmelfennig 2014). This idea 
31 
 
stems from the notion that by providing a variety of sources of information and thus differing 
opinions, citizens will be more willing to participate in the policy-making process (Weare, 2002). 
Scholars like Benkler (2006) and Jenkins (2006) argued that the internet would increase 
exposure to more diverse perspectives outside of mainstream thought, including a greater 
diversity of political information independent of state control. This diversity of information 
would then help citizens make better decisions, therefore simultaneously benefiting both 
democracies and liberating individuals in oppressive countries (Mutz and Martin, 2001; 
Diamond 2010). 
For this reason, the United States has been a strong international advocate for an open 
internet, free from censorship and surveillance under repressive regimes. Following an internet 
shutdown in Egypt during political unrest, U.S. President Barack Obama declared that the U.S. 
“stand[s] for universal value, including the rights of the Egyptian people to freedom of assembly, 
freedom of speech, and the freedom to access information” (Tully, 2014:179). Similarly, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged the importance of digital rights, even the 
controversial right to the internet, in the opening quote of this section.  
The efforts by the United States to champion internet access have encountered several 
setbacks. The 2013 Snowden revelations revealed the United States’ hypocritical stance on 
privacy and surveillance. Despite publicly denouncing digital authoritarianism and encouraging 
foreign nationals to utilize digital media to exercise their digital rights, the United States 
differentiates the rights of non-U.S. and U.S. citizens as such: “US persons may only be targeted 
if there is a judicial warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), whereas 
non-US persons can be targeted without FISC-approved individual warrant” (Watt, 2017:775). 
This division clearly undermines the universality of digital rights, thus threatening their 
recognition as a human right. Surely the international community sees the irony of the Obama 
administration’s explicit recognition of global privacy rights in Presidential Policy Directive 
No.28 and the continuous reinstatement of mass surveillance practices through various policies 
with differing names (Margulies, 2013). 
 The position the United States touts regarding digital rights does not align with its own 
domestic policies, let alone its international stance. Prior to 2013, the advocacy by the United 
States for an open internet had legitimacy, as did its criticisms of Russia and China for restricting 
their citizens’ online rights. However, a post-Snowden United States continues to face a serious 
backlash and effectively breed distrust even among its allies (Spiegel Online, 2013). 
Furthermore, the lack of action by the United States concerning Chinese mass internment and 
censorship of its Uighur population in Xinjiang and the spread of malicious disinformation to 
breed hostility against the Rohingya in Burma highlights how the United States is mostly a 
figurehead for the free internet movement, rather than a proponent to its normalization (Fuchs et 
al., 2018; CBSN Originals, 2018). 
 This is not to say that the United States is not an important influence for the protection of 
digital rights. Despite an overall worsening trend in internet freedom and digital rights, the 
United States remains a remarkably strong case for freedoms of speech, assembly, and political 
participation. In a time of rising digital authoritarianism, the United States serves as a model for 
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how the internet can be used to further diversity in political discourse with minimal legal or 
technical restriction on publication or access (Freedom House, 2011). Moreover, even what has 
become known as the “greatest privacy meltdown of our time,” (referring to the Snowden 
revelations) had only a small impact on internet users’ online behaviors (Preibusch, 2015:48). In 
short, the United States is not the perfect advocate for its own purported values but its global 
influence and state-level progress to rectify the hypocrisy have made it an important actor.8 
Additionally, the United States’ emphasis on freedom of speech allows for NGOs within its civil 
society to be proponents for internet freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 However, this may be changing under the Trump administration. Reports emerged this year that a proposal is 
in the works to use social media to identify people who are falsely claiming Social Security disability benefits. 
Such a proposal allows for further surveillance of the American pubic and disproportionately affects those with 
disabilities (Pear, 2019). 
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Germany 
 I. DOMESTIC CYBER POLICIES 
“The freedom of expression also protects repugnant and ugly remarks. But, freedom of 
expression is not a pass to commit crimes. Those who share criminal content online must be held 
accountable to justice. Calls for murder, hate speech, or Holocaust denial are not expressions of 
freedom of expression but are instead attacks on the freedom of expression of others.” 
-Minister of Justice and Consumer Protection Heiko Maas on January 3rd, 2018. 
 The use of propaganda to incite hatred against minorities was prevalent prior to and 
during the second world war in Germany. Therefore, post-WWII legislation was intended to 
criminalize such activity. With the introduction of the internet Germany was quick to extend its 
Criminal Code to encompass online content, particularly through Section 130 which addresses 
incitement of hatred: 
(1) Whosoever, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace 
1. Incites hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group defined by their 
ethnic origins, against segments of the population or individuals because of their 
belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or segments of the population or calls 
for violent or arbitrary measures against them; or 
2. Assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning an 
aforementioned group, segments of the population or individuals because of their 
belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or segments of the populations, or 
defaming segments of the populations, 
shall be liable to imprisonment from three months to five years. (Appell, 2019) 
 Much like the United States and other democracies, Germany must battle between how to 
tackle online hate speech in conjunction with upholding freedoms of expression and media and 
the right to privacy, all of which are protected by Germany’s Basic Law Articles 5 and 10, 
respectively. Harsher boundaries around online speech and activities are seen as more legitimate 
to many Germans compared to civilians of other countries because of their country’s history 
(Freedom House, 2018b). German penal law routinely allows for censorship in the cases of hate 
speech, dissemination of child pornography, glorification of violence, and Holocaust denial.  
Of these categories, laws protecting against child pornography have been the hardest to 
uphold. The Access Impediment Act was passed in June of 2009 and was intended to block 
websites containing child pornography. Before implementation took into effect, a new 
governmental party coalition formed and criticized the act on civil rights grounds. Consequently, 
when the law was promulgated it was altered to only use the take-down provision rather than 
blocking websites due to heavy backlash from internet freedom activists who said the law was 
the beginning of internet censorship and a violation of expression (European Digital Rights, 
2011). In April 2011, governing bodies decided to repeal the law altogether. However, the 
introduction of a new law, the Network Enforcement Act (also called NetzDG, see Table 6.1), at 
the start of 2018 has brought this issue up once again for public debate. 
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Table 6.1 Germany Major Laws and Regulations 
Law/Regulation Date 
Promulgated  
Purpose/Relevance 
Act for Limiting the Secrecy 
of Letters, the Post, and 
Telecommunications 
2001 Allows secret services to intercept, monitor, and record 
private communications, and it differentiates between the 
protected professions. Allows for the surveillance of 
counselors and journalists in certain situations 
Freedom of Information 
Legislation 
2006 Establishes information held by public authorities should 
be open and available, however has exceptions and every 
request requires fees 
Act on Strengthening Press 
Freedom 
June 2012 Improves protections for journalists and their sources, 
strengthens related sections in the Criminal Code and 
Code of Criminal Procedure 
Asylum Law (amendments) 2017 Allows for the copying and analyzing of arriving refugees’ 
electronic devices’ in order to determine where the person 
came from and where they spent their time if he or she 
does not provide identity documents. 
Source Telecommunications 
and Online Surveillance 
Law  
 
June 2017 Allows law enforcement and the state to install malware 
known as State Trojans on electronic devices for 
surveillance purposes and perform online searches to 
investigate criminal offenses. Amends the German 
Criminal Code. 
German Privacy Act 
(BDSG-new) 
July 2017 Governs the exposure of personal data and protects 
individuals’ personal rights when personal information is 
being processed. Does not apply where GDPR applies. 
Law for More Effective and 
More Practical Criminal 
Proceedings 
August 
2017 
Includes an extensive list of criminal offenses that could 
allow for the deployment of spyware on suspects’ 
electronic devices for the purpose of copying and 
monitoring written and spoken text. 
Social Network 
Enforcement Law 
October 
2017 
Pushes to curb the dissemination of hate speech, terrorist 
propaganda, and fake news on social media, establishes  
fines against social networking companies in the event 
that they do not remove flagged criminal content from 
their platforms 
Network Enforcement Act 
(NetzDG)  
January 
2018 
Obliges social media platforms with more than 2 million 
registered users in the country to delete offensive illegal 
content within 24 hours and or else face hefty fines. These 
platforms are given one week to review content that is 
deemed more legally ambiguous. 
Sources: (Freedom House, 2018b; Freedom House, 2013; European Digital Rights, 2011; 
Appell, 2018; OpenNet Initiative, 2010; Deloitte, 2019) 
 NetzDG was the result of Minister of Justice and Consumer Protection Heiko Maas’ push 
to mitigate the increasing amount of hate speech online as a result of the influence of social 
media in recent elections, the polarization of political opinions, and the rise of civil unrest 
(Appell, 2018). Under this law, internet platforms must ensure that their websites only contain 
legal content, thus shifting the responsibility away from internet users. Social media companies 
in particular are compelled to remove hate speech. For this reason, NetzDG draws criticism from 
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both sides of the political spectrum in Germany, including the far-left Left Party and the far-right 
Alternative for Germany. Human Rights Watch also argues that this law violates Germany’s 
obligation to respect free speech because (1) the burden of censorship falls on companies under 
conditions that then encourages censoring of potentially lawful speech as a precaution and, (2) 
NetzDG fails to provide judicial oversight (Appell, 2018). Despite criticisms against the 
implementation of this law, which Chancellor Angela Merkel has said is subject to alteration, the 
intention seems to strike a balance between freedom of expression and hate speech which 
violates others’ freedom of expression (Cooper, 2018). Yet, by doing so even Maas points out 
that digital rights are subservient to the law, opening the door for further policies to legally limit 
rights and bring into question the inalienability of digital rights. 
 This sentiment also holds true when it comes to users’ privacy. According to Germany’s 
Criminal Procedure Code Section 100a, “telecommunication of an individual may be monitored 
and recorded if: 
1. Specific facts substantiate the suspicion that somebody was the perpetrator or 
participant in a serious crime as listed in paragraph 2 or, in cases where the attempt is 
liable to persecution, has attempted to commit such crime, or has prepared such crime 
by means of a criminal offense 
2. The alleged crime would weigh heavily even taken individually 
3. Investigating the act or determining the suspected person’s location by other means 
would be significantly impeded or futile without surveillance” (OpenNet Initiative, 
2010). 
This provision gives a legal basis to require German ISPs and online service providers to 
retain some types of data for up to six months, even without initial suspicion of illegal activity. 
This has been the case in the southern state of Bavaria where a bill was introduced in the 
beginning of 2018 that has been called the hardest policing law since 1945 (Bröckling , 2018). 
Under this law, concrete evidence of a specific crime is unnecessary for police to preventatively 
access any information technology system (Freedom House, 2018b). Similarly, amendments 
made in 2017 to the German Asylum Law (see Table 6.1) allows for the copying and analyzing 
of refugees’ electronic devices in order to determine their place of origin in cases where 
documentation cannot be provided (Freedom House, 2018b). Moreover, new legislation like the 
Law for More Effective and More Practical Criminal Proceedings shown in Table 6.1 allow law 
enforcement agencies to install malware on suspects’ electronic devices in order to aid in 
criminal investigations. One such malware is the “Bundestrojaner”, or federal Trojan horse, 
which has been legally in use since August 2017 (Prantl, 2018). This software clandestinely 
records data in order to extract needed information and has been justified by German authorities 
as a measure against terrorism and right-wing extremism. 
Germany’s position within the European Union greatly influences domestic policies. In 
April 2017, Germany’s federal parliament, the Bundestag, incorporated in its own domestic law 
the European Union rules on net neutrality (Freedom House, 2018b). Prior to this, Germany 
defined basic requirements for a non-discriminatory data transfer system, however no 
requirements were established (Freedom House, 2013). As discussed in the previous section, net 
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neutrality ensures equal opportunity to view, interact with, and share information online for 
internet users and is essential for the full enjoyment of the right to information.  
In May 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which has been called the 
most important change in data privacy regulation in 20 years, went into effect (European 
Commission, 2019). This law contains 70 opening clauses in order to allow European Union 
member states to legally enact and modify the GDPR to fit their domestic environment. In order 
to conform to the requirements of the GDPR, Germany replaced its previous privacy act, the 
BDSG, with the BDSG-new (see Table 6.1) in the same month (Deloitte, 2019). Under this new 
law and regulation, any company, regardless of where it is located, that processes the personal 
information of individuals residing in the European Union must respect that individual’s rights or 
else face hefty fines (European Commission, 2019). These rights include: breach notification, 
right to access, data portability, privacy by design, access to a data protection officer, and the 
right to be forgotten (European Commission, 2019). 
Among its goals of obtaining more meaningful consent, increasing data collection 
transparency, and giving users the ability to manage their data directly, the GDPR also legally 
reinforced a new digital right in Germany: the right to be forgotten (European Commission, 
2019; Freedom House, 2018b). This right “reflects the claim of an individual to have certain data 
deleted so that third persons can no longer trace them” (Weber, 2011:121). Furthermore, this 
right allows internet users to withdraw their consent to data processing at any time. The right to 
be forgotten differs from the right to privacy because rather than dealing with information that is 
not publicly known, it is used to remove information that is publicly known at any certain time 
and blocks third parties from accessing the information when it is gone (Weber, 2011). Much 
like the right to the internet, the right to be forgotten has been criticized for degrading the 
concept of human rights (Mayes, 2011). Furthermore, the right to be forgotten is seemingly at 
odds with freedoms of expression and press and the right to privacy. The GDPR has rules 
providing exceptions to the right to be forgotten in cases where the exercising of freedom of 
expression and information are necessary, however these exceptions are not well defined 
(Human Rights Watch, 2018b). Such a right may also be used as a justification for censorship or 
as a legal way to rewrite history in the hands of the wrong government. This right has also been 
criticized for enabling people in positions of power to abuse it in order to remove harmful 
articles that discuss their previous criminal convictions (Human Rights Watch, 2018b). Yet, 
advocates claim that it is the only way to resolve perpetual online stigmas from scenarios such as 
long-standing minor infraction records, false accusations, and revenge porn (Arthur, 2014). 
This right was first established in a May 2014 EU Court of Justice decision in the case of 
Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario Costeja. The GDPR also ensures the protection of this right, 
however debate surrounding its legitimacy is still occurring in Germany, particularly after the 
June 2018 European Court of Human Rights case of M.L and W.W. v. Germany. This case 
decided that there was no violation of Article 8 (right to respect private life) in the case of two 
German half-brothers who murdered a popular actor and were seeking to prohibit a media 
company from keeping a transcript of a past interview on its internet portal (Google Spain v. 
AEPD and Mario Costeja, [2014]). In this case, the scenario resulted in the freedom of press to 
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outweigh the right to be forgotten. However, the right to be forgotten has been successfully 
utilized against Google where approximately 670,835 requests to delete search results in the 
European Union have been assessed. The scope of these requests would affect over 2 million 
URLs, nearly 112,000 of which coming from Germany (Google, 2018). 
Apart from the controversy that surrounds the right to be forgotten, the GDPR gives users 
back partial control over their data and holds large social media companies accountable. In 
general, media and internet freedom are well-respected within Germany where substantial 
safeguards are in place to protect essential digital rights. Perhaps the best example of the ability 
to exercise these rights is the lively debate surrounding them in Germany. For this reason, of the 
four case studies Germany has the best score for Freedom House Freedom on the Net score of 19 
out of 100 in 2018. 
II. INTERNATIONAL STANCE 
As the unofficial leader of the European Union, regulations like the GDPR generally 
require the support of Germany. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, the impact of the 
GDPR on international relations will be a proxy for Germany’s international stance. As 
previously discussed above, the GDPR applies to all companies that process the personal 
information of individuals located within the European Union, regardless of the location of the 
company. Furthermore, those outside of the European Union whose data is being collected or 
processes by companies within the European Union are also affected (Read, 2018). Given the 
global nature of the internet, this has far reaching implications and virtually every company or 
organization with at least one client or employee located within the EU must follow the 
regulation. Consequently, the GDPR forces non-EU and EU-member states to confront 
regulatory differences and raises questions about internet, user, and territorial sovereignties. 
Regulatory differences are especially pronounced between the United States and the European 
Union where a well-established transcontinental data transfer system has been in place for 
decades (Kobrin, 2004). The GDPR places users’ and internet sovereignties above territorial 
sovereignty. Indeed, there are concerns that the facilitation of the expansion of internet 
sovereignty by the GDPR already violates Israeli sovereignty (Or-Hof, 2018). Unlike China’s or 
Russia’s view of internet sovereignty, which falls within territorial sovereignty, the European 
Union sees internet sovereignty as transnational because it falls within user sovereignty.  
The NetzDG law also has international influence. Article 19, a British human rights 
organization that advocates for freedom of expression, argued that the NetzDG “severely 
undermine[s] freedom of expression in Germany, and is already setting a dangerous example to 
other countries” (Global Network Initiative, 2017). Despite Freedom House’s score as one of the 
most free countries on the net, the NetzDG is setting a precedent for less free countries on how to 
force social media companies to act as censors. In Singapore, the government cited the NetzDG 
law as a positive example while it attempts to crack down on fake news through overly broad 
criminal laws (Ministry of Communications and Information and Ministry of Law, 2018). 
Additionally, Russia cited provisions in NetzDG when proposing its own laws to censor Russian 
citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2018a). Human Rights Watch also warns that the implications of 
the NetzDG law had a domino effect in the aforementioned countries as well as the Philippines, 
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Venezuela, Kenya, and the United Kingdom (Human Rights Watch, 2018a). Therefore, despite 
being an advocate for digital rights domestically and attempting to strike a balance between 
censorship of freedoms of expression, Germany is currently serving as an indirect advocate for 
systematic censorship internationally. 
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Comparative Analysis and the Consideration of Regime Type 
I. TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency and human rights have an arguably overlapping relationship. This 
governmental trait is a required prerequisite for both good governance and the protection of 
human rights. Human rights and good governance have a mutually reinforcing relationship, and 
both set the boundaries in which governments must work. Transparency allows individuals to 
hold governments accountable when they work outside those lines; therefore, without it the 
status of human rights and good governance are hard to clearly decipher.  
Patrick Birkinshaw (2006) recognizes that a specific attribute of transparency, namely the 
freedom of information which extends from access to government information, deserves special 
protections and argues that this particular attribute ought to be treated as an internationally 
recognized human right. For the purpose of this thesis, the direct overlapping of transparency and 
human rights will be delinked as the specific attribute Birkinshaw mentions falls within the 
domain of digital rights.9 As such, transparency will simply refer to openness of governmental 
operations to ensure that the government is working in the best interest of its people, not select 
groups.   
Indeed, the internet is fundamentally a transparent endeavor. It facilitates the limitless 
transborder exchange of photo, texts, videos, sounds, documents, and more. This data and 
information can then be sorted, stored, and queried by anyone with access to the internet. This of 
course is in an ideal world; the reality is the internet is controlled by states and where an internet 
user is located can greatly affect access to information.10 It would then logically follow that the 
transparency, that is openness of the governmental system to the general public, of a state may 
affect the treatment of digital rights. 
This section will first examine the transparency of each case study and their treatment of 
digital rights. Although the concepts of control of corruption is not a perfect measure of 
transparency because it does not wholly encompass the concept transparency, this indicator will 
be used as a proxy variable for transparency because it does address transparency, accountability, 
and corruption in the public sector. This indicator includes both oversight and civil society 
access and acknowledges the relationship between accountability and transparency by way of 
corruption levels. When initially using this indicator, the percentile rank was used but, in an 
effort to provide greater accuracy, was opted out in favor for the governance score.11 The 
standard error which measures the precision of the estimate of each indicator for both the 
transparency and political stability sections were evaluated. Each score was found to be at or 
                                                          
9 It is also for this reason that the voice and accountability global governance indicator was not used to measure 
transparency. This indicator measures the perceptions of the extent in which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in their government by exercising various rights, thus overlapping with digital rights. Moreover, the 
voice and accountability indicator was analyzed and the results seemed to indicate collinearity between the 
measures.  
10 Various types of software exist to circumvent a state’s internet sovereignty, VPNs come first to mind.  
However, these can also be affected, criminalized, or controlled by states. While in China the author 
experienced this when during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China many VPNs 
temporarily stopped working.  
11 However, both measures of control of corruption demonstrated largely the same findings. 
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below 0.24, indicating a sufficiently precise score.12 The analysis of the control of corruption 
indicator and Freedom House violation of users’ rights scores and internet freedom scores will be 
used to assess the following hypotheses: H1 as a state’s transparency decreases it is more likely 
to be invasive of its citizens’ digital rights and, H2 as a state’s transparency increases it is more 
likely to protect its citizens’ digital rights. Transparency will be measured by the World Bank’s 
control of corruption global governance indicator. This indicator accounts for the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, as well as the level in which the state is influenced by 
elites and private interests.  
A. China  
China, the consistently worst abuser of internet users’ digital rights according to Freedom 
House (see Figure 7.1), superficially seems to appear to have a correlation between transparency 
and internet freedom score, albeit not an expected one. The control of corruption governance 
score (transparency) improved every year for a total improvement of +0.26 between 2011 and 
2016 (see Figure 7.2).  
Figure 7.1 Freedom House User Rights Violation Scores 2011-2018  
 
Source: Data from Freedom House Freedom on the Net Reports for China, Russia, United States, and 
Germany from 2011-2018 
 
 
                                                          
12 The control of corruption standard error was more precise than political stability with a highest score of 
0.16. 
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This improvement could be attributed to President Xi’s campaign against corruption 
which began following the 18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012. In the same year, 
corruption within the CCP was “spiraling out of control” which was exasperated when top CCP 
politician Bo Xilai was under investigation after his wife was convicted of murdering a foreigner 
(Schmitz, 2017). This event may have catalyzed Xi’s crusade against corruption which has thus 
far led to the investigation and punishment of hundreds of thousands of government officials 
(Schmitz, 2017). Concurrently, Figure 7.1 shows that China’s Freedom House scores for 
violation of users’ rights has also risen consistently, indicating a worsening of users’ rights. 
Indeed, China reached the scale’s highest score of 40 in 2015 and remained there since.  
Figure 7.2 World Bank Control of Corruption Global Governance Indicator 2011-2017  
 
Source: Data from World Bank's Control of Corruption Indicator13 
Looking at Figure 7.3, China’s overall freedom score has also been worsening since 
2011, with the exception of a 1-point dip in 2017. Upon closer inspection, this dip was due to a 
slight improvement in obstacles to access the internet. This subsection remained constant in 2018 
but the overall internet freedom score returned to 2016 levels due to a worsening of limits on 
content. Therefore, this slight “improvement” is not related to digital rights but a slight 
improvement of infrastructure and internet penetration rates. Interestingly, this dip in 2017 is 
also mirrored in Figure 7.2 by a -0.02 worsening of transparency. A possible explanation could 
                                                          
13 Governance scores begin in 2011 to mirror the onset of Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net reports in 
order to provide more accurate analysis. No scores were provided for 2018. 
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be the CCP’s opaqueness in dealing with anti-corruption and bribery. In 2017, the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was authorized to conduct random checks on the 
“Leading Cadres’ Personal Matters Report Form,” a 16-page background check form (Zheng, 
2019). Ironically, the CCP’s attempts to increase transparency by weeding out corruption has led 
to less transparency in its proceedings.  
Figure 7.3 Freedom House Internet Freedom Scores 2011-2018 
 
Source: Data from Freedom House Freedom on the Net Reports for China, Russia, United States, and 
Germany from 2011-2018  
A. Russia 
As easily the least transparent state out of the four case studies, Russia has no clear 
relationship between transparency and digital rights abuse. Between 2011 and 2014, Russia’s 
control of corruption governance score improved slightly by +0.15 but worsened slightly by         
-0.03 points in 2015 (see Figure 7.2). According to Transparency International, this initial 
improvement could be attributed to President Medvedev’s anti-corruption campaign, particularly 
anti-bribery legislation and the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of 
Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation to Improve State Anti-Corruption 
Management (Kremlin, 2011). However, corruption under President Putin has been inconsistent, 
albeit relatively consistently bad, with a marginal improvement in 2016 of +0.13 but a return to 
almost 2014 levels in 2017. Despite being corrupt himself, President Putin pushes to improve the 
state anti-corruption system (Cooke, 2014; Kremlin, 2016). While Russia’s transparency teetered 
over the last decade, its internet freedom score and violation of users’ rights score remained 
consistent. Figures 7.1 and 7.3 show a worsening of internet freedom and users’ rights between 
2011 and 2017, but with an exception of a 1-point improvement in 2018. In 2015, Russia’s 
internet freedom score crossed over from partially free to not free and has remained so. 
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B. United States 
The United States is a robust democracy, as such the control of corruption scores are 
significantly better than the previous two case studies. This is due to extensive laws, acts, and 
statutes put into place, on the state and federal level, that date back to the founding of the United 
States. Such legislation continues to be expanded upon, including the introduction of the 
American Ant-Corruption Act of 2011.  
Yet, corruption does exist within the United States which explains the fluctuation of its 
control of corruption scores in Figure 7.2. Despite high levels of corruption control and a 
relatively large increase of +0.14 in 2012 compared to 2011, Figure 7.2 shows a drop of -0.1 the 
following year.  Indeed, in 2013 60 percent of Americans felt this drop and expressed concern, 
albeit falsely, that corruption increased since 2011 (Bidwell, 2013). Although public opinion on 
corruption is not always accurate, Transparency International did conclude that the United States 
has fallen six places in its 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index since 2017, confirming a general 
downward trend since 2015 (Detrick, 2019). During this time, a general upward trend can be 
seen in Figures 7.1 and 7.3, indicating a worsening of internet freedom and users’ rights 
violations. However, given the inconsistent nature of the transparency scores it is not accurate to 
correlate the transparency trends starting from 2016 to the trends in Figures 7.1 and 7.3. 
C. Germany 
Germany has the highest rankings every year out of the four case studies according to the 
World Bank’s control of corruption global governance indicator. This ranking has remained 
consistently at 1.84 since 2014 and experienced only minimal fluctuation in the two years prior 
to that. A 2013 Freedom House report attributed Germany’s institutional setup as the reasoning 
for its ability to ensure integrity and avoid corruption in state bodies (Freedom House, 2013). 
Figures 7.1 and 7.3 show mild inconsistency between Germany’s internet freedom scores and 
users’ rights violation scores. Figure 7.1 shows that Germany is steadily increasing its violations 
to its users’ violations over the last 8 years, increasing from a score of 7 to a score of 11. 
Meanwhile Figure 7.3 shows that between 2011 and 2017 Germany’s internet freedom 
worsened, except in 2012 when it improved by 1 point due to a 1-point improvement on limits on 
content. Unlike the United States, Germany’s internet freedom score is not mostly influenced by 
its violations on users’ rights. Instead, limits on content and obstacles to access is more varied 
over the years and influence the overall internet freedom score more. Regardless, neither the 
general upward trend seen in Figure 7.3 nor the clear upward trend seen in Figure 7.1 appears to 
correlate with the generally stagnant transparency trend seen in Figure 7.2. 
D. Key Findings 
This thesis hypothesized both that a correlation exists between a state’s transparency and 
treatment of digital rights. Two hypotheses were specifically stated; H1 as a state’s transparency 
decreases it is more likely to be invasive of its citizens’ digital rights and, H2 as a state’s 
transparency increases it is more likely to protect its citizens’ digital rights. The data presented in 
Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 not only refute these hypotheses, but suggest that a strong correlation 
appears to not exist. If such a correlation existed, then China, as the worst violator of digital 
rights, would be the least transparent state. Yet, Russia is significantly less transparent but is 
marginally more respective of digital rights. However, a possible explanation for this 
discrepancy is that Russia is an exception to the rule. The analyses of the other three states seem 
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to suggest general patterns, especially when considering that the indices chosen are not perfect 
measures. 
 China’s transparency scores and Freedom House scores might superficially suggest that 
there may exist a correlation, however this may be a coincidence of the data.14 Similarly, despite 
a clear upward trend in Germany’s violation of users’ rights, no general upward or downward 
trend is witnessed in the same years for transparency. Russia’s and the United States’ teetering 
transparency scores run concurrently with the general upwards trends of internet freedom and 
violation of users’ rights scores. 
Generally speaking, states with greater transparency tend to have less violations of users’ 
rights and, consequently, better internet freedom scores. However, a correlation between 
transparency and treatment of digital rights is not clearly demonstrated. Instead, the data 
represented in these figures concerning transparency and treatment of digital rights appear to be 
dependent variables of another factor, perhaps regime types. It is perhaps no coincidence that the 
two states with positive transparency scores and lower scores for violation of users’ rights are 
both liberal democracies. Nor is it perhaps a coincidence that the states with negative 
transparency scores and higher violation of users’ rights scores are both authoritarian regimes. 
Given the authoritarian nature of China, it is surprising that there is an upward trend in 
transparency, however this can be attributed to President’s Xi anti-corruption campaign. It is in 
the best interest of authoritarian governments to violate digital rights because of media’s ability 
to bring attention to and shame corrupt individuals and political scandals, which may result in 
political unrest. 
 Moreover, although the data collected in this thesis does not appear to demonstrate a 
clear correlation, one may still exist. The inability of the data to confirm these hypotheses may 
be due to the secretive nature in which states implement internet and cyber policies. United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, warned of a “disturbing lack of 
transparency about governmental surveillance policies and practices” (Pally, 2014). This lack of 
transparency makes determining a state’s overall treatment of digital rights impossible to 
determine. Consequently, the scores by Freedom House in Figures 7.1 and 7.3, while helpful, do 
not show the whole picture. For example, prior to the Snowden revelations in 2013 the United 
States’ internet freedom and users’ rights violations scores were declining despite ongoing 
surveillance. Only after the revelations were exposed did these scores change. Perhaps a 
correlation may still exist if all the data were present. In transparent states it may seem like there 
are more violations of digital rights because information regarding policies is more open to the 
public. This could help explain how in China as transparency increased, so did knowledge of 
users’ rights violation. 
 
II. POLITICAL STABILITY 
 The level of political stability in each case study will also be measured by a World Bank 
global governance indicator, in this case more directly by the political stability and absence of 
                                                          
14 When the voice and accountability indicator was being considered a similar analysis to the one presented 
above was conducted. This indicator produced results that seemed to affirm H1 and H2 but, as mentioned in an 
earlier footnote, this is a probably a result of collinearity. 
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violence/terrorism indicator. This indicator measures the likelihood of political instability along 
with politically motivated violence, including terrorism, protests, riots, and war. This indicator, 
along with the Freedom House data, will be utilized to analyze the following hypotheses: H3 
states with low levels of political stability are more likely to interfere in their citizens’ digital 
rights through policies that are claimed necessary to protect national security, and H4 states with 
high levels of political stability are more likely to implement policies to protect their citizens’ 
digital rights. 
 These hypotheses work under the assumption that a relationship between political 
stability and treatment of human rights exists, thus implying a relationship between political 
stability and digital rights also exists. The former already has a substantial amount of literature 
backing it by various human rights scholars (see Henderson, 1991; Mitchell and McCormick, 
1988; Poe and Tate, 1994). Although a relationship exists, Mitchell and McCormick (1988) 
would disagree that there is a direct relationship, but rather political stability is a factor within 
regime type. These scholars found that democracies and states affected by democracy 
development tend to have greater respect for human rights (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988). 
Political instability then relates to regime type by the presence or absence of regular and irregular 
government change in different types of regimes. Feng (1997) concluded that democracies tend 
to allow major and frequent regular government change and reduces the probability of irregular 
government change, thus allowing for a politically stable environment. By contrast, non-
democracies do not allow for frequent major regular government change, instead the rule of one 
dominant party eventually evolves into irregular government change, otherwise known as 
political instability. 
 Although a state’s government type does affect treatment of human rights and level of 
political stability separately, this section will look to see if a direct correlation between political 
stability and digital rights appears to exists. This will allow for a more nuanced analysis of the 
relationship between human rights and political stability by analyzing specific case studies over 
the last decade which has seen the decline of the old liberal order. 
A. China 
Despite two decades of collective leadership and smooth transitions of power, China’s 
political stability and absence of terrorism ranking has remained in the lower quartile range since 
2000. Additionally, China’s political stability governance scores remained negative throughout 
the last decade (see Figure 7.4). The CCP’s strategy of choosing successors, sometimes years 
prior to the expected ending of the current leader’s term, allowed for strong continuity of CCP 
rule without the upset of elections (Palmer, 2018). However, this tradition that began with Deng 
Xiaoping in the 1980s was suddenly abolished when President Xi15 ended term limits in 2018. 
This move may afford temporary and factitious political stability as many repressive 
dictatorships tend to do in their early years but coincides with a plethora of destabilizing internal 
factors (Von Rohr, 2014). The carceral archipelago16 of the western provinces of Tibet and 
                                                          
15 Often called Emperor Pooh, a nod to the censorship of Winnie the Pooh in China due to the supposed 
likeness he shares with the animated character. 
16 (Foucault, 1975) Coined from the book Discipline and Punish which talks about surveillance systems and 
technology in modern societies to practice social control in all areas of social life. 
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Xinjiang, rising separatist sentiment in Taiwan, militarization within the nine-dash line, and 
terrorist attacks all contribute to China’s low levels of political stability (Tsirbas, 2016).  
Figure 7.4 World Bank Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Global 
Governance Indicator 2011-2017  
 
Source: Data from World Bank Control of Corruption Global Governance Indicator 
Figure 7.4 shows that Chinese stability reached a low point of -0.55 in 2015, effectively 
breaking what seemed to be an improvement from 2011 to 2014. This coincides with China’s 
violation of users’ rights scores reaching their highest levels. This seems to align with 
Hypothesis 3. Indeed, as already discussed in the China section, policies aimed at controlling 
internet users’ digital rights are often justified by their necessity to maintain national security. In 
2017, the World Bank saw a noticeable increase in Chinese stability of +0.25 from the previous 
year, almost reaching 2000 levels. This also coincides with a slight improvement in China’s 
internet freedom score, seen in Figure 7.3. However, this same trend is not mirrored in Figure 7.1 
and thus does not represent an improvement in protecting citizens’ digital rights. Interestingly, in 
2000 and 2017, years of relatively higher political stability, more major domestic cyber laws 
were passed to restrict citizens’ digital rights than in less stable years (see Table 3.1). Perhaps 
these policies were implemented in order to prepare for instability that is expected to come. If so, 
the possibility of time lags in both transparency and political stability as they relate to digital 
rights must be considered. 
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B. Russia 
The World Bank indicator in Figure 7.4 shows that Russian stability has varied more on a 
yearly basis than China. Figure 7.4 begins during the 2011 parliamentary ballot and 2012 
presidential vote in Russia. During this election cycle Russian leaders were anxious about the 
internet’s potential for political disruption, particularly following the use of social media as a 
catalyst for the events in the Arab Spring (Nocetti,2015). The implementation of the 2012 
Foreign Agents Law (see Table 4.1) reflects these concerns about the internet’s potential. 
Furthermore, Figure 7.4 shows a noticeable decline in political stability in 2014, most likely 
attributed to the beginning of the annexation of Crimea. The ongoing conflict with the West over 
Ukraine provided justification for a further repressive internet agenda which included the 
implementation of two major domestic cyber policies (see Table 4.1; Nocetty, 2015).  
These events coincide with a marked increase in Russia’s internet freedom and violations 
of users’ rights scores in 2014, the former of which has since steadily continued to increase while 
the latter peaked in 2016 and 2017. Rural and urban protests since 2013 can also account for the 
worsening in political stability throughout these years and resulted in further crackdowns on 
digital rights. Figure 7.4 shows slight improvement in Russia’s political stability in 2016 and 
more noticeably in 2017, possibly due to a marginal economic improvement that seemed to 
foreshadow an end to the recession was in sight (Holodny, 2017). Concurrently, Figure 7.1 
shows a peak in Russia’s violation of users’ rights score in these two years, indirectly refuting 
Hypothesis 4 which predicted times of stability would see policies that protect digital rights. 
Hypothesis 3 seems to hold some truth in that Russia, as a less stable country, violates users’ 
digital rights in order to protect national security, specifically naming extremism as justification. 
C. United States 
According to Feng (1997), it is expected that as a democracy the United States would be 
more politically stable than the non-democracies of China and Russia. This is confirmed in 
Figure 7.4 where even at its least stable in this given time period, the United States’ political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism governance score remains consistently positive. Even 
at its lowest point of 0.3 in 2016, the United States was far more stable than both China and 
Russia in the same year, which ironically was their most stable year.  
Although not seen in Figure 7.4, according to the World Bank’s political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism ranking indicator, the United States was most stable in 2000.17 
Between 2002 and 2005, the United States experienced its most political instability most likely 
due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the beginning of the wars with Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Although Freedom House was not publishing reports during these years, Table 5.1 shows that 
three major domestic cyber policies were implemented during these years. These policies allow 
for the direct violation of digital rights and act as the foundation for future policies to further 
harm digital rights.  
Figure 7.4 shows that between 2011 and 2015 the United States’ stability remained 
relatively consistent, varying at most by 0.1. These scores coincide with the United States’ 
violation of users’ rights scores sharply increasing from 2011 to 2013, and then more slowly 
from 2013 to 2015 (see Figure 7.1). Once again, in years of relatively higher stability the United 
                                                          
17 Data has been collected since in 1996. 
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States drafted laws, or extended older laws, that negatively impact digital rights. As already 
discussed in the transparency analysis, the upsurge seen in Figure 7.1 for the United States in 
2013 is not the result of sudden increase in policies but rather the public only just becoming 
aware of such policies already existing.  
A similar logic helps to explain the decrease in violations in users’ rights score in 2016. 
The violation of users’ rights 2016 score coincides with a drop in political stability in 2016, 
which is most likely due to the 2016 presidential elections. The simultaneous drop in political 
stability and slight drop in violation of users’ rights could both be attributed to Russian offensive 
cyber operations on the 2016 presidential election (McKew, 2018). The fact that the 2016 drop in 
political stability did not return to 2015 levels in 2017 is then a result of growing political unrest 
and protests and is mirrored by the return to a slight increase of higher violation of users’ rights 
scores. The data concerning the United States seems to align with both Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Regarding Hypothesis 3, the relative political instability between 2001 and 2004 witnessed the 
implementation of domestic cyber policies that curtailed citizens’ digital rights in order to protect 
national security from further terrorism. As a whole, Hypothesis 4 is supported by how the 
United States retains high levels of political stability and does have policies and laws in place to 
protect digital rights, starting from its constitution to state laws protecting privacy and net 
neutrality. 
D. Germany 
Once again, Feng would attribute Germany’s stability to its democratic governance. Yet, 
over the years Germany’s stability has teetered. Although not available in Figure 7.4, Germany’s 
highest level of political stability since 2002 was in 2006 after Chancellor Merkel assumed office 
in 2005. During this time of high political stability, an important piece of legislation was passed 
to improve transparency (see Table 6.1). Between 2006 and 2012 the Germany’s World Bank 
political stability governance score steadily declined, possibly as a result of Merkel’s party 
lacking an outright majority and needing a political coalition to govern (World Bank, 2019). 
Before noticeably improving in 2013, Germany passed another legislation to defend journalists’ 
freedom of information and by proxy digital rights. Despite an improvement in stability in 2013, 
Figure 7.1 shows that Germany’s violation of users’ rights score increased within the same year, 
possibly due to greater awareness of surveillance technologies in Germany.  
Stability takes another hit in Germany following an influx of refugees starting in 2015. 
The refugee crisis in Germany enflamed social tensions and resulted in various laws and 
regulations (see Table 6.1) to curb online hate speech, fake news, and harmful content (Freedom 
House, 2018b). This is reflected in the increase in Germany’s violation of users’ rights scores 
beginning in 2016. Political instability remained an issue in 2017, particularly due to the 
proliferation of disinformation leading up to the federal elections in September (Freedom House, 
2018b). The emergence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the slow collapse of the Social 
Democrats (SPD) have also contributed to the disruption of Germany’s political stability in the 
last two years. The lack of an outright majority to form a government by one political party 
undoubtedly contributes to Germany’s recent political stability scores (Conley, 2018).  
Despite this, Germany’s violation of users’ rights score in 2018 did not increase. In fact, 
new legislation from the European Union is helping to counter Germany’s domestic cyber 
policies that may infringe on digital rights. Unlike the previous three cases studies, when 
Germany’s political stability is relatively higher, it has not proactively implemented policies that 
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violate digital rights. Instead, it partially affirmed Hypothesis 4 and implemented policies, that 
originated at the regional level, to protect digital rights. Perhaps this is due to its involvement in 
the European Union and its more robust protection of human rights through additional human 
rights conventions. As a leader in the European Union, Germany must also act as a role model, 
therefore it must be more careful, or secretive, about protecting digital rights particularly in times 
of stability. Germany does seem to confirm Hypothesis 3 because in times of lower political 
instability it enacted various policies that interfered in their citizens’ digital rights in order to 
maintain public order.  
E. Key Findings 
By analyzing each case study’s political stability and treatment of digital rights over the 
years it seems that there is some merit to their hypothesized relationship. For the ease of the 
reader, those hypotheses were: H3 states with low levels of political stability are more likely to 
interfere in their citizens’ digital rights through policies that are claimed necessary to protect 
national security, and H4 states with high levels of political stability are more likely to implement 
policies to protect their citizens’ digital rights.  
Generally speaking, states with less political stability do tend to violate their citizens’ 
digital rights more than more politically stable states, and always with the excuse that it is 
necessary to protect national security. However, national security can reference different 
concerns depending on the state. In the case of China and the United States, protecting national 
security meant protecting against terrorism. For Germany and Russia, it meant protecting against 
extremist speech. For the former extremist speech means hate speech and for the latter it equates 
to speech that threatens Russian elites or the government. In the United States and Germany, 
where political stability levels are higher, when stability falters policies were implemented that 
harm digital rights, but not always. When Germany faced a steady decline of political stability 
from 2006 to 2012, instead of implementing policies that violate digital rights, some policies 
were implemented to guarantee more protection of them. Although this may have been seen as 
well at the state level in the United States, it was not witnessed nationally. This difference, as 
previously discussed, may be a result of the influence of the European Union which holds 
Germany more accountable. Conversely, the United States does not have an equally influential 
regional body that could affect its domestic policies. Additionally, the United States is a greater 
power than Germany and as such does not feel as obligated to abide by the rules and guidelines 
of international bodies. As states with relatively lower political stability given their regime type, 
the implementation of policies that harm digital rights in Russia and China confirm Hypothesis 
3. Furthermore, in times of even lower political stability, China cracked down further on digital 
rights. 
The affirmation of Hypothesis 4 is less clear. At the surface-level more politically stable 
states have more policies that protect digital rights. This can be seen in both the United States 
and Germany. Yet, this does not hold true when looking within each case study. For non-
democratic states, this Hypothesis is refuted. Figures 7.1 and 7.4 show that despite a dramatic 
improvement in political stability in China in 2017, China’s violation of users’ rights score 
remains at the highest possible level, indicating no correlating improvement. Similarly, Russia’s 
rise in political stability in 2017 is met with no improvement of the treatment of digital rights. 
This can be interpreted as the governments’ attempts to reinforce their rule. Similarly, for the 
democratic case studies Hypothesis 4 is also debunked. Between 2011 and 2015, the United 
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States experienced high levels of political stability, yet during this time implemented secretly and 
overtly policies that infringe on digital rights. When experiencing high levels of political stability 
in Germany, however, regional policies like the GDPR were implemented, but not at the national 
level. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis demonstrates that the view a country takes on digital rights can sometimes be 
predicted by its signatory statuses on the ICCPR and ICESCR. China, Russia, and Germany all 
ratified the ICESCR. Consequently, they all have particularly robust laws aiming to protect 
children’s rights (Article 10 of ICESCR). As discussed in these states’ individual sections, they 
all have cited the protection of children’s rights, which are affected by dissemination of child 
pornography, as reasons for implementing online constraints. Interestingly, the United States, 
which has signed but not ratified the ICESCR, has often signed laws protecting against child 
pornography only to later nullify them on the grounds that they are unconstitutional.18 The 
United States remains the laxest of the four case studies in regards to children’s rights in relation 
to the internet. Often children’s rights take a backseat to freedom of expression in the United 
States, which is a reflection of the United States’ hierarchy of human rights where ICCPR rights 
come before those found in the ICESCR. As a state that signed and ratified both the ICCPR and 
ICESCR, a similar debate often occurs in Germany with mixed results.19 Although Russia also 
ratified both human rights conventions, the same issue is not seen, at least not as noticeably, 
most likely due to the asymmetric power of the state over society which allows it to largely 
ignore public criticisms. 
From the early conception of the internet, even prior to its commercialization globally in 
the 1990s, scholars and governments were already concerned with its impact on human rights. 
The right to privacy was among the earliest concerns to be addressed by laws and charters and 
remains a high concern. The scope of human rights that are affected by the use of the internet 
and digital technologies continues to expand, thus drawing concern about their protection from 
human rights organizations. Most recently, the implementation of the Social Credit System in 
China exemplifies the emergence of a new digital right: the freedom of movement. As an active 
trailblazer for oppression of digital rights, the further violation of this right can be expected by 
other states taking note from China. Although not yet publicly seen, the right to belong to a 
country may also be affected in the near future due to the increasing conflicts posed by differing 
stances on internet sovereignty lines as a result of the expansion of internet policies and 
infrastructures. A state’s stance on internet sovereignty seems to follow its IR theoretical 
perspective on state sovereignty. China takes a constructivist realist approach where country 
borders determine both state and internet sovereignty, yet China’s expansion of internet 
infrastructure and censorship training camps suggest an approach to disseminate their own 
norms. Russia views internet sovereignty and state sovereignty with a strict realist lens. In both 
cases, China and Russia advocate for complete control of their domestic policies and ignore 
international criticisms. The United States and Germany both adhere to neoliberal policies in 
regard to internet sovereignty, but perhaps Germany more so due to its involvement in the 
                                                          
18 The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 is one such example. The Supreme Court struck down this 
act in 2002 because it was found too broad and thus violated the First Amendment (Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 2002). 
19 The Access Impediment Act of 2006 was an attempt to contain the dissemination of pornography but was 
repealed due to violation of freedom of expression. Similar debates are occurring again with the enactment of 
the 2018 NetzDG law. 
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European Union. Germany, through proxy of the EU, is constructivist through its use of 
expanding its internet sovereignty in order to influence other states to accept its digital norms. 
Thus while China and Germany both hold stances with potential constructivist implications, they 
value very different norms. Diverging perspectives on internet sovereignty are likely to become 
an increasingly present issue and requires further research. 
Aside from the already well-established rights, the development of policies and practices 
regarding the internet and other digital technologies has the potential to birth new rights. The 
first case of this comes from the European Union: the right to be forgotten. Such a right cannot 
be directly equated with pre-existing rights but falls closely within the concepts of right to 
privacy and freedom of expression. For reasons discussed above, it can be predicted that this 
right is more likely to take hold in states that have ratified the ICCPR. As technologies, 
particularly artificial intelligence, continue to advance further digital rights can be expected to 
emerge and will undoubtedly give rise to more ethical and legal concerns. Therefore, digital 
rights must be afforded particular attention in both states and international organizations. The 
case of the right to be forgotten is of particular interest because its timeline and success or failure 
will determine the feasibility of a regional body disseminating a digital norm. However, 
international organizations should not be complacent and wait. Instead, a proactive approach is 
needed to first create an international convention for digital rights. Within said convention, the 
question of whether internet access should be considered a human right must be formally 
addressed. 
The types of policies enacted, and treatment of digital rights is largely affected by 
government type. The comparative analysis section of this essay posed and determined the 
validity of four hypotheses. The greatest insights to emerge from these hypotheses were; (1) a 
correlation between political stability and treatment of digital rights does exist, and (2) a 
correlation between transparency and treatment of digital rights is inconclusive, but an apparent 
correlation between government type and digital rights does exist. The latter insight prompted 
further analysis of all of the Freedom House Freedom of the Net reports between 2011 and 2018. 
The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 8.1. The trend lines suggest a clearly possible 
correlation between regime type and treatment of digital rights. The more democratic a state is, 
the less violations of users’ rights are observed while the opposite is true the more authoritarian a 
state is. Figure 8.1 also shows a new insight; with the exception of full democracies, every 
regime type’s treatment of digital rights has been worsening since 2013. The only reason full 
democracies do not demonstrate this trend is because of the United Kingdom’s 2018 violation of 
users’ rights score which acted as an outlier. For that reason, the dashed line represents the data 
of all full democracies excluding the United Kingdom. With this updated line, all regime types 
show a consistent worsening of the treatment of digital rights. This is a concerning trend that if 
not addressed through international conventions might continue. 
Incorporating internet access into such a convention will likely cause factions among 
states split along government regimes types. Based on the information presented in this thesis, it 
could be predicted that full democracies and flawed democracies would be advocates of such a 
right. Conversely, hybrid and authoritarian regimes will be opposed. Perhaps decentralized or 
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fragmented legal approaches will be necessary to develop the initial treaties with the hope that 
digital rights norms subsequently will cascade.  
Figure 8.1 Average Violation of Users’ Rights Scores According to Regime Type 2011-2018  
 
Source: Data collected from the Freedom on the Net Reports from 64 countries.20 Each country was 
categorized into full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime, and authoritarian regime based on the 
2018 Democracy Index.21  
*Full Democracies excluding the United Kingdom 
Moreover, the validation of the apparent correlation between regime type and digital 
rights has an impact on other avenues of research, including: the use of the internet for 
democratization, the dissemination of digital norms in various types of regimes, and the 
categorization of what digital rights are at risk based on regime type. By categorizing treatment 
of digital rights by regime type it may be possible to anticipate the evolution of a state’s digital 
rights hierarchy. Based off the information provided in this thesis, emerging and established 
                                                          
20 Not all countries had data reported for all years. This was taken into account when calculating averages for 
each year. 
21 Germany and 5 other countries are represented within the full democracy line. The United States and 18 
other counties are represented within the flawed democracy line. Both Russia and China along with 21 other 
countries are represented within the authoritarian regime line. The hybrid regime line consists of 16 countries. 
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democracies tend to place freedom of expression and privacy over most other rights, except 
when in times of relative political instability. Democracies facing political instability will 
increase policies restricting online freedoms of expression in order to curb political 
disinformation and hate speech. Similarly, during times of instability due to acts of 
violence/terrorism, democracies are far more likely to enact surveillance policies that violate 
individuals’ right to privacy.  
Figure 8.1 shows that hybrid regimes’ treatments of digital rights are currently worsening 
at the fastest rate. One possible explanation could be the success of authoritarian regimes to 
instill some form of political stability with higher levels of online constraints. A characteristic of 
hybrid regimes is instability (Menocal, Fritz, and Rakner, 2008). Therefore, these states may be 
more inclined to implement harsher internet policies after witnessing their success in 
authoritarian states. Current challenges to liberal democracies and democratization may dictate 
whether the digital rights norms related to democratic regimes or authoritarian regimes spread. 
Yet, the rise of digital authoritarianism22 shows that some rights are equally at risk regardless of 
regime type. The most notable example is the right to privacy which is systematically 
undermined by the use of mass surveillance in both democracies and authoritarian regimes. 
This research demonstrates the prevailing relationship between digital rights and regimes 
type. This relationship has important implications considering the reliance of the internet in the 
intensification and progress of globalization in the Global South. Despite no single prevalent 
regime type in the Global South, most of the states in this category recognize the necessity of 
globalization for economic growth and development. To the extent that globalization is linked to 
free movement of goods, capital, and ideas, there could perhaps be a preference to maximize 
digital rights to gain these benefits. As such, connecting to the internet may be a priority in the 
years to come.23 During this transition to a globally connected world the types of policies to be 
implemented and subsequently the treatment of digital rights in these states may be predicted by 
the regime type. The future of digital rights as a norm could follow two trajectories when put in 
the context of the findings of this research. First, as the Global South goes online the 
dissemination of what digital rights norms will cascade depends on the regime types of the states 
in this category. The digital rights norms to prevail in this trajectory are dependent upon which 
type of regime has the most practitioners. Second, the acceptance of internet sovereignty over 
territorial sovereignty in cyberspace will give states that do not subscribe to the realist view of 
sovereignty an edge in disseminating their digital rights norms. This can be exemplified by the 
extension of digital rights norms by the European Union and Germany beyond their territory.  
Yet, perhaps more important than the above-stated factors are the expected demographic 
and generational shift that may affect societal, and eventually states, attitudes toward digital 
rights. Younger generations and the generations to come depend upon the digital world and 
globalization, more so than older generations. As a result, younger cohorts might feel less of a 
                                                          
22 Term coined in Freedom on the Net report 2018 (Shahbaz, 2018). 
23 Indeed, the African Union, with the support of the World Bank Group, aims to have every individual, 
business, and government in Africa connected to the internet by 2030 in order to lay the foundations for a 
digital economy (World Bank Group, 2019). 
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blind loyalty to their state, particularly due to a greater awareness of the practices of individual 
rights in other states. It could then logically follow that younger generations may support norms 
that treat digital rights, especially the right to internet access, as a derogable human right. While 
most globalized states are facing the issue of an aging population, parts of the Global South—
namely Africa—have the highest percentage of youth populations (World Atlas, 2019). 
Therefore, as Africa becomes increasingly more connected and younger generations that grew up 
with the internet replace older generations around the world it could be the case that greater 
support for a movement toward a norm of digital rights might emerge. The beginnings of such a 
movement are already evident in the expansion of the scope of digital rights in charters and 
conventions. Therefore, although this research shows that regime type effects the treatment of 
digital rights and thus the conception of digital rights as human rights, technological and 
demographic change has the potential to alter the specific nature of global practices. 
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